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An important difference in the way audience members understand story characters is 
whether they take an actor’s or an observer’s perspective, paralleling the role of an actor or an 
observer in social interactions. Social psychologists have long identified the actor-observer 
asymmetry in understanding social events (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 
2007; Robins, Spranca, & Mendelsohn, 1996). However, how taking an actor’s or an observer’s 
perspective might influence understanding story characters has not been systematically 
examined, and there are no easy-to-use measures of these two narrative processing strategies.  
Taking the social cognitive approach, this dissertation conceptually distinguishes the 
actor’s from the observer’s perspective in processing narratives and operationalizes actor-
observer perspective (AOP) using multi-dimensional scales. Chapter 1 reviews the existing 
approaches to understanding how people process story characters in the communication literature 
and introduces the social cognitive approach of this dissertation. Chapter 2 distinguishes the 
actor’s from the observer’s perspective in processing narratives. An actor’s perspective is 
conceptualized as simulating story events from the perspective of an actor actively participating 
in the behavior; an observer’s perspective is conceptualized as simulating the story events as an 
onlooker who observes the character’s behaviors and maintains a separate self-identify from the 
character. Chapter 2 further discusses the different indicators of actor’s and observer’s 
perspective. Chapter 3 examines the role of character morality in influencing actor-observer 
perspective through two studies. Study 1 focuses on the effects of character morality on 
egocentric projection and identification. Study 2 investigates how character morality influences 
  
the type of explanations people use for character behavior. Findings suggest people tend to take 
an actor’s perspective when interpreting moral characters, indicated by the higher level of 
egocentric projection onto the character, greater identification with the character, paying closer 
attention to their unintentional behaviors (e.g., running into the boss after work), and providing 
more external causes (e.g., character’s specific situations) to explain these behaviors. In contrast, 
when processing immoral characters, people tend to take an observer’s perspective by focusing 
more on intentional behaviors (e.g., cheating on an exam for a better grade). Chapter 4 proposes 
multi-dimensional measurements of actor-observer perspective (AOP). An exploratory factor 
analysis in Study 3 and a confirmatory factor analysis in Study 4 were conducted to explore and 
validate the AOP scales. Six indicators of AOP are identified—egocentric projection, 
understanding from the character’s perspective, external attribution, capability explanation, 
internal attribution, and intention judgment. The former four indicate taking an actor’s 
perspective, and the latter two indicate taking an observer’s perspective. Using a persuasive 
narrative about food safety, Study 4 also found that the different indicators of actor’s perspective 
are associated with different persuasive outcomes. Understanding from the character’s 
perspective increased the audience’s intention to perform safe food handling practices, whereas 
egocentric projection reduced such behavioral intention. The theoretical implications of actor-
observer perspective in the psychology of narrative and the practical implications of the AOP 
scales are discussed.  
 
Keywords: perspective taking, actor vs. observer, narrative processing, health persuasion, 
character morality, scale development
 
 
 
 v 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Shuo Zhou was born in Beijing, China. She attended School of Journalism and Communication 
at Hong Kong Baptist University for her Bachelor’s and M.Phil.’s degrees. As an undergraduate, 
she covered several major International events and was enthusiastic at interviewing people from 
all walks of life to write interesting stories. It was at that time she realized the critical impacts of 
narrative on changing people’s beliefs and health behaviors. The strong interests in narratives, 
social cognition, and health drew Shuo to Cornell for graduate school where she has been guided 
and mentored by Prof. Michael A. Shapiro in pursuit of her Ph.D. in media psychology and 
health communication. 
 
  
 
 
 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. 
Michael A. Shapiro for the continuous support throughout my Ph.D. program at Cornell, for 
asking challenging questions that motivate me to think research issues more deeply and 
philosophically, for encouraging me to follow my heart and explore interesting questions, and for 
always being patient and supportive. This dissertation would not have been possible without your 
wonderful guidance.  
Next, I would also like to extend special thanks to other members of my doctoral 
committee, Dr. Jeff Niederdeppe, Dr. Sahara Byrne, and Dr. Thomas Gilovich. I will never 
forget your passion and highly efficient working style, your enthusiasm in helping me prepare 
job interviews, and your insightful comments that always inspire me for better ideas. I feel 
fortunate to have you as my committee members. 
Thank you to my close friends, Andrea Won, Tae Kyoung Lee, Sherri Katz, Jia Hepeng, 
Theo Lee, Li Huisi, Zhang Hao, Ouyang Can, Guo Jingyi, Guo Mengjia, and Yilu for your 
company and supporting me spiritually through my five years as a doctoral student. 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my parents, Qu jingxia and Zhou Chuanqing 
for your understanding and your enduring and selfless love. 
  
 
 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ......................................................................................... viii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
Existing Approaches to Understanding How People Process Story Characters ......................... 2 
The Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding Narrative Processing ................................... 4 
Chapter 2: Conceptualization of Actor’s and Observer’s Perspective in Narrative 
Processing ...................................................................................................................................... 7 
Evidence of Actor-Observer Differences in Social Cognition ................................................... 7 
Distinguishing Actor’s from Observer’s Perspective in Narrative Processing ........................... 9 
Elements of Actor-Observer Perspective in Narrative Processing ........................................... 10 
Chapter 3: Factors Influencing Actor-Observer Perspective and the Effects of Character 
Morality ....................................................................................................................................... 17 
Background ............................................................................................................................... 17 
Effects of Character Morality on Actor-Observer Perspective ................................................. 19 
Study 1 ...................................................................................................................................... 25 
Study 2 ...................................................................................................................................... 31 
Chapter 4: Operationalization of Actor-Observer Perspective in Narrative Processing and 
the Role of Actor-Observer Perspective in Health-Related Narrative Persuasion ............... 38 
Study 3 ...................................................................................................................................... 39 
Study 4 ...................................................................................................................................... 54 
Chapter 5: General Discussion .................................................................................................. 77 
Theoretical and Practical Implications ...................................................................................... 77 
Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 80 
Future Directions ...................................................................................................................... 83 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 87 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 89 
APPENDIX A: STORY STIMULI IN STUDY 1-3 ............................................................... 107 
APPENDIX B: STORY STIMULI IN STUDY 4 ................................................................... 109 
 
  
 
 
 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Table 1: Factor Loadings Based on a Principle Components Analysis with 
Varimax Rotation of the 24-item Actor-observer Perspective Scales 
(Study 3) 
48 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Research Variables (Study 4) 63 
Table 3: Summary of Model Fit Indices (Study 4) 72 
Figure 1: Effect of Character Morality on the Type of Event Recalled (Study 2) 33 
Figure 2: Effects of Character Morality on AOP Scales (Study 3) 49 
Figure 3: One-factor Measurement Model (Study 4) 65 
Figure 4: Standardized Coefficients of the Baseline Measurement Model 
(Study 4) 
66 
Figure 5: Standardized Coefficients of the Final Measurement Model (Study 4) 69 
Figure 6: Standardized Coefficients of the Baseline Structural Regression 
Model (Study 4) 
71 
Figure 7: Standardized Coefficients of the Revised Structural Regression 
Model (Study 4) 
74 
  
 
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Narrative is the simulation of social worlds (Schank & Abelson, 1995). Reading 
narratives is one way we develop understandings of social others (Oatley, 2016). Research has 
shown that the more people read fictions, the better their understandings of other people (Mar, 
Oatley, & Peterson, 2009; Fong, Mullin, & Mar, 2013; Kidd & Castano, 2013). However, 
readers differ significantly in how they process and understand story characters. In many ways, 
there are as many Hamlets as there are people reading about Shakespeare’s character. When 
processing narratives, audience members may use a variety of mental strategies to interpret the 
characters’ cognitions, emotions and behaviors. 
In everyday social interactions, an individual can have two types of relationship with a 
behavioral event: either as an actor doing the behavior or as an observer witnessing others doing 
the behavior. These two different perspectives usually lead to distinct understandings of and 
explanations for the same event, identified as actor-observer asymmetry (also actor-observer 
bias) in social psychology (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007; Robins, 
Spranca, & Mendelsohn, 1996). This distinction is also supported by evidence from neuroscience 
studies which indicate that a person activates different brain areas as a performer of an action 
(being an actor) in a situation compared to when observing others performing the behavior 
(being an observer) (David et al., 2006; Decety, 2005; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Ruby & 
Decety, 2004).  
The actor-observer distinction in perceiving social events may also apply to story 
processing. Similar to real-world interactions, audience members may interpret the same 
character and event differently depending on which perspective they take. One possibility is that 
when understanding a story character, an audience member may mostly take an actor’s 
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perspective in some circumstances—imagining story events from the perspective of an actor who 
actively engages in the behavior; in other circumstances, an audience member may mostly take 
an observer’s perspective—understanding the story events by observing the actor’s behaviors, 
and maintaining a separate self-identify from the character (Goldman, 2006). It is important to 
note that these two processes are not in opposition to each other. Audience members may use 
both perspectives in understanding a character (discussed in more detail below).  
To understand the importance of distinguishing actor-observer perspective in narrative 
processing, it is necessary to review how scholars investigated narratives in the past, particularly 
the previous approaches to understanding how audiences interpreted story characters. By 
reviewing these approaches, we can form a clear picture of how the actor-observer perspective 
approach to narrative processing is different from and contributes to the existing narrative 
theories in the communication literature. 
Existing Approaches to Understanding How People Process Story Characters 
One major approach is to understand narrative as a form of entertainment media. 
Researchers in this domain are interested in questions such as why people consume narratives or 
select certain types of entertainment media (Bryant & Davies, 2006). Perceptions and evaluations 
of story characters are important because they have implications for various components of 
attraction (e.g., liking, perceived similarity, wishful identification), which help us understand 
how people get entertained by media stories (Hoffner & Cantor, 1991; Vorderer, Klimmt, & 
Ritterfeld, 2004). For example, disposition-based theories focus on how character morality is 
linked to enjoyment, claiming that audience members form affective dispositions towards 
characters that range from strong liking to strong dislike (Raney, 2004; Zillmann & Cantor, 
1976). People will enjoy the narrative most when liked or moral characters receive positive 
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outcomes and disliked or immoral characters suffer. In other words, enjoyment is maximized 
when justice is done. Lee and Shapiro (2016) expand this line of research by identifying the role 
intentionality plays in making moral judgments of story characters.  
To further address why people are sometimes attracted to sad stories or complicated story 
characters, Oliver and colleagues distinguish two types of motivations for consuming media 
entertainment—hedonic and eudaimonic motivations. Specifically, people with hedonic 
motivations seek for pleasure, whereas people with eudaimonic motivations seek for the truth of 
the world, the purpose of life, and virtue of human beings. Research findings show these two 
types of motivations are related to preference for different genres of media entertainment and 
different affective responses (Oliver & Raney, 2011; Oliver & Bartsch, 2011). People with high 
eudaimonic motivations are likely to have more meaningful affective experiences and elicit 
affects such as inspiration, awe, and tenderness rather than fun, pleasant or entertained. Another 
somewhat related approach draws on self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), which 
studies media enjoyment as the satisfaction of people’s intrinsic needs: autonomy, competency, 
and relatedness (Tamborini, Bowman, Eden, Grizzard, & Organ, 2010).  
Another important approach focuses on narrative engagement. Among the various 
theorizations of narrative engagement (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009), there are two distinct but 
closely connected forms of narrative engagement that are well-recognized: transportation (Green 
& Brock, 2000) and identification (Cohen, 2001; de Graaf, Hoeken, Sanders, & Beentjes, 2012; 
Hoffner, 1996). Transportation is a process in which an audience member, like a traveler, 
transports him/herself to the narrative world, rendering the real world less accessible (Gerrig, 
1993). When transported, the entire story (including its characters, setting, and plot) absorbs 
readers’ attention and emotions. Identification describes audience members’ specific reactions to 
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story characters. Identification takes place when “an audience member imagines him- or herself 
being that character and replaces his or her personal identity and role as audience member with 
the identity and role of the character within the text” (Cohen, 2001, p.251). Identification has 
also been conceptualized as people’s desire to become a certain character, which is labeled as 
wishful identification (Hoffner, 1996). Narrative engagement is considered the most important 
mechanism of narrative persuasion (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Green & Brock, 2000; Slater & 
Rouner, 2002). Abundant evidence suggests that engaging in narrative messages may enhance 
message influence on people’s beliefs, risk perceptions, behavioral intentions, and actual 
behaviors by attracting the audience’s attention away from competing stimuli (Busselle & 
Bilandzic, 2008), eliciting more intense emotional reactions (Small, Loewenstein, & Strnad, 
2006; Hoeken & Sinkeldam, 2014), reducing psychological reactance (Dal Cin, Zanna, & Fong, 
2004; Zhou & Shapiro, 2017), and establishing connections between the story and the audience 
(Cohen, 2001; Hoffner & Buchanan, 2005).  
The Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding Narrative Processing 
Although both the media entertainment approach and the narrative engagement approach 
have enriched our understanding of how audience members react to story characters (Sood, 
Menard, & Witte, 2004), these approaches tend to emphasize the outcome of such reaction over 
the process of understanding characters. A social cognitive approach—and the one being taken 
here—looks at understanding narrative as an extension of how we judge people in daily life. 
Oatley (2016) understands narrative as “a set of simulations of social worlds that we can 
compare … with aspects of our everyday world, to suggest insights we might not achieve by 
looking with the single eye of ordinary perception” (p. 618). Just as we could practice flying 
skills in a flight simulator, reading narratives could be our mind’s flight simulator improving our 
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social skills. Likewise, Zunshine (2006) conceptualizes narrative as a way to practice Theory of 
Mind (TOM), which is the cognitive capacity to ascribe mental states to oneself and others, 
attributing intentions, thoughts and feelings to the self or others to explain and predict behaviors. 
Our minds are eager to know other people’s unobservable mental states, especially for story 
characters who are usually more interesting than most people in everyday life. Narratives provide 
readers an immersive and simulative experience of social interactions, which can improve the 
skills for social inference (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, dela Paz, & Peterson, 2006). 
When reading a novel or watching TV programs, audience members need to keep track of the 
characters’ goals, thoughts and feelings to understand their behavioral events and vicariously 
learn from their experience. Some people are more motivated to exert mental efforts to 
understand others’ minds as a personal trait (Carpenter, Green, & Vacharkulksemsuk, 2016).  
The current research is rooted in this social cognitive approach to understanding 
narratives and focuses on how people make inferences about a story character’s mental states in 
specific story scenarios and interactions. I argue that narrative processing is not much different 
from trying to understand interesting people in real social interactions. Just as we could be either 
an active performer doing the action or an outside spectator observing the action in daily events, 
processing narratives turns each audience member into an actor and/or an observer, whether 
aware of it or not. We could take an actor’s or an observer’s perspective to interpret story 
character’s mental states and behaviors. Findings in the social cognition literature show that 
actors and observers differ significantly in how they perceive social events: an actor focuses 
attention on the situational or impersonal factors that he/she is interacting with and an observer 
focuses attention on the stable personal factors (Heider, 1958; Jones & Nisbeet, 1971; Mall & 
Pearce, 2001). However, few studies have examined the distinctions between taking an actor’s 
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and an observer’s perspective in understanding story characters. This dissertation applying actor-
observer differences from social cognition to the narrative context will fill this gap and provide 
new insights into understanding story processing. 
The goal of this dissertation is to (1) conceptually distinguish actor’s from observer’s 
perspective in narrative processing (Chapter 2); (2) explore message features (i.e., character 
morality) leading to more or less actor/observer’s perspective (Chapter 3); (3) develop 
measurements of actor-observer perspective (AOP) to operationalize the two types of perspective 
(Chapter 4); and (4) examine the key persuasion outcomes of actor/observer’s perspective in 
health-related narratives (Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualization of Actor’s and Observer’s Perspective in Narrative 
Processing  
Accurately understanding others’ thoughts, feelings, and intentions is critical in social 
life. “Perspective taking” is recognized as one mental strategy for understanding others’ 
situations, minds, and actions. It generally refers to perceiving an event, a situation, an object, or 
a person from a point of view that differs from the perceiver’s original point of view. However, 
perspective taking has several meanings in the literature and can be understood in different ways: 
as relying on one’s own mental states to reason how another person experiences a particular 
situation (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996), as egocentrically projecting one’s own mental 
states and then making adjustments (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004), as adopting 
the character’s goals, thoughts, and feelings (Cohen, 2001), or as the cognitive capacity to 
consider different viewpoints (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). Although researchers 
generally agree that perspective taking involves a switch from one’s immediate perspective to a 
somewhat different perspective, it is less clear what kind and whose perspective people actually 
adopt.  
The current dissertation focuses on two types of perspectives that audience members may 
take when processing media story characters: 1) from the perspective of an actor who performs 
the action described in the story, or 2) from the perspective of an observer who witnesses the 
actor performing the action described in the story. I will provide the rationale for this distinction 
below. 
Evidence of Actor-Observer Differences in Social Cognition 
The social cognition literature has long distinguished between actor and observer visual 
perspectives in perceiving social behaviors (Fussell & Krauss, 1989; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; 
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Sutin & Robins, 2008; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004). An actor is the person who has the 
agency and actively engages in a behavior, focusing on the environment or objects that are 
interacting with the self (Malle, 2005); an observer is the person who objectively views the 
behavior from an outsider’s perspective, focusing on the person who carries out actions and 
making a clear distinction between the self and the observed person (Decety, 2005; Jones & 
Nisbett, 1971; Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  
The actor and observer roles are associated with differences in how actions are judged. 
For example, the classic attribution theory suggests actors tend to use situational factors to 
explain their behaviors whereas observers tend to use stable dispositional factors to explain the 
actor’s behaviors (Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Storms, 1973). Malle and 
colleagues further investigate the actor-observer asymmetry in attribution based on folk-
conceptual theory. They posit actors pay closer attention to unintentional events and observers 
pay closer attention to intentional events (Malle & Knobe, 1997). In addition, compared to being 
an observer, being an actor leads to closer perceived psychological distance to the behavioral 
event (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009). Actors tend to focus more on specific processes of how 
the action is performed, whereas observers tend to focus more on the broad goals of the event, 
such as why the event happens and what are its effects. 
In real social interactions, people can temporarily mentally switch their roles as an actor 
or observer. For example, when observing social others’ behaviors, people may hypothetically 
imagine oneself rehearsing the same behavior or envision one’s own consequences while 
performing the behavior. This vicarious learning process (Bandura, 1965, 2002) suggests people 
have the cognitive capacity to project oneself into another person’s situation and experience what 
it would be like in that situation, shifting one’s role from an observer to an actor. Another 
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circumstance is when we retrieve autobiographic memories and construct personal memories 
from an observer’s points of view (Nigro & Neisser, 1983), shifting one’s role from an actor to 
an observer. Similar to film actors/actresses watching their own films, we sometimes retrospect 
what we did in the past, build mental imageries of our own behaviors, and “see” ourselves as if 
we were another person. These possibilities of switching the role of an actor and an observer 
suggest that the actor-observer distinction is not simply a result of different identities or visual 
perspectives in social interaction, but more importantly, relates to two distinct mental inference 
strategies depending on whether the perceiver takes an actor’s or observer’s perspective. 
Distinguishing Actor’s from Observer’s Perspective in Narrative Processing 
Making judgments about story characters is psychologically similar to making judgments 
about social others (Reeves & Nass, 1996). In fact, many studies in the social cognition literature 
use stories to simulate real world actor-observer situations (i.e., Jones & Harris, 1967; Karasawa, 
1995; Malle, Knobe & Nelson, 2007). For example, actor’s perspective is manipulated by 
instructing participants to tell their personal stories of performing a behavior. In the observer’s 
condition, participants listened to the previously recorded actor’s story (Malle, Knobe & Nelson, 
2007, Study 6).  
When applying the actor-observer distinction in social interaction to story processing, we 
should note that by default an audience member is an observer external to the story events. This 
is because a story is usually about another person who has a different temporal and spatial 
framework and different goals from the audience member. Also, audience members may get 
access to more or less information about the depicted situation than the character (Carroll, 2011). 
For example, when watching the movie Jaws, audience members know a killer shark is nearby 
whereas the swimmers do not realize this risk (Goldman, 2006). So although audience members 
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could understand what the characters in the movie are thinking and feeling, typically they do not 
adopt the same perspective as the characters who participate in the story event (Coplan, 2004). In 
this process, an audience member maintains a separate identity and a degree of detachment from 
the character (Coplan, 2004; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Goldman, 2006). According to Carroll 
(2011), “We respond to fiction from outside. Our point of view is that of an observer of a 
situation (p. 311)”. Similarly, Currie (1997) advances the hypothetical-observer-of-fact theory, 
suggesting audience members of narratives usually take the perspective of a hypothetical person 
who observes the story events as facts. This hypothetical-observer perspective is different from 
audience members’ immediate real life perspective because the story scenes are not happening in 
real life at that particular moment.  
Another way of shifting perspective from the immediate environment to an imagined 
environment depicted in a narrative is that audience members enter the story event as an actor, 
simulating the events from the view of the actor doing the action and interacting with other 
objects, as if they were right there in the event—putting the self in another person’s shoes 
(Galinsky & Ku, 2004). In this circumstance, audience members will not see the self or the 
character in the scene. Instead, they focus attention on the situation and the objects that they are 
interacting with.  
Elements of Actor-Observer Perspective in Narrative Processing  
Egocentric projection. One element of taking an actor’s perspective in narrative 
processing is to project what audience members think their own thoughts and feelings would be 
in the story scenario onto the story character’s thoughts and feelings in that situation (Epley, 
Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004), which is called “egocentric projection”. For example, 
when playing chess, one strategy players may use to predict the opponent’s movements is by 
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imagining what decisions the player would make if in the opponent’s position. Egocentric 
processing appears to be a starting place when making mental inferences and varies with 
motivation and ability to make adjustments. People tend to maintain the initial egocentric 
perspective if there is a low level of motivation or no need (e.g., high perceived similarity 
between self and another person) to make an adjustment or could not recognize that other people 
may think differently (Epley et al., 2004; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2005). By egocentrically 
projecting their own thoughts and feelings onto a story character’s mind, people imagine the self 
as the actor actively engaging in story events in the depicted scenarios (Ames, 2004a, 2004b). 
Therefore, egocentric projection reflects the extent to which an audience member takes an actor’s 
perspective. 
Understanding from the character’s perspective. While egocentric projection captures 
how much the audience member shapes the character to match his/her own thoughts and feeling, 
communication scholars have often focused on how the character’s thoughts and feelings 
influence the audience member. The second element of actor’s perspective in narrative 
processing: “understanding from the character’s perspective” is rooted in the conceptualization 
of identification by Cohen (2001), which is defined as an imaginative process through which 
audience members mentally simulate the character’s activities in the narrative, imagine what the 
character (rather than the self) is thinking and feeling, and share the character’s goals, thoughts, 
and emotions (Batson, 2009). For example, identifying with movie heroes who saved the world 
may induce audience members to engage in prosocial behaviors, internalizing the same goal as 
the hero’s. Through identification, audience members exercise intersubjective sharing of mental 
experience (Zlatev, Racine, Sinha, & Itkonen, 2008), enabling the reader to take an actor’s role 
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by vicariously engaging in other’s experiences. Therefore, conceptually, identifying with the 
story character indicates a higher level of taking an actor’s perspective in narrative processing. 
Although greater egocentric projection and greater identification with story characters 
are both associated with greater actor’s perspective, there are important differences in the 
underlying processes. Egocentric projection is a relatively fast and intuitive way of making 
mental inferences about the behaviors of other people. It activates a perceiver’s own way of 
thinking and projects it to the character. Identification, however, is a process in which people 
simulate the character’s rather than one’s own mental states. When identifying with a character, 
an audience member temporarily deactivates her/his own mindset and adopts the character’s 
thoughts and feelings, making the audience member more like the character. Therefore, 
conceptually the direction of influence for egocentric projection is from the self to the character 
while understanding character perspective/identification is from the character to the audience 
member. 
In the later part of this dissertation, I use “understanding from the character’s 
perspective” rather than “identification” to label this element of actor’s perspective taking to 
avoid confusions in the conceptualization and operationalization of identification. First, the 
concept of identification has different meanings in the communication literature—identification 
as an imaginative process (Cohen, 2001), as empathy and merging (Oatley, 1999), as a wishful 
identification (Feilitzen & Linne, 1975; Hoffner & Buchanan, 2005), as perceived similarity with 
the character, or as an intimate relationship with the character. Second, operationally, the scale of 
identification loads differently depending on the stimulus material (Campbell & Barrow, 2004). 
Some identification items emphasize merely understanding the character’s view (e.g. “I think I 
have a good understanding of character X); other items emphasize taking the character’s view by 
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feeling and thinking the same as the character (e.g. “While viewing the show, I could feel the 
emotions character X portrayed”; “While viewing the program, I felt as if I was part of the 
action). If people identify with a character because of shared similarities but without any 
motivation to recognize the difference between the character and the self, or without any concern 
for other people, it may lead to egocentric considerations and projecting one’s mental states to 
others’ minds. 
To clarify, understanding from the character’s perspective specifically refers to 
simulating the story character’s situation and imagining the character’s mental states in that 
situation. Together with egocentric projection, they are the indications of the actor’s perspective. 
Behavioral explanation. The actor and observer perspectives lead to differences in how 
attention is allocated and how attributions of behavioral events are made. Malle (1999) posits 
that an actor needs to continuously monitor the surrounding situation within which he/she 
performs behaviors. Therefore, actors are more attentive to their own unintentional actions 
because these behaviors are less controllable. Intentional actions are driven by their own needs 
and desires and are more or less automatically performed, so actors do not need to consciously 
monitor one’s own goals and intentions while performing behaviors (Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
On the other hand, one goal for an observer is to infer his/her communication partner’s 
goals and intentions, which can ultimately facilitate ongoing interactions (Goffman, 1974).  So 
other people’ intentional actions are particularly relevant to an observer’s communication goals, 
and observers usually pay more attention to intentional behaviors which carry more 
informational value and are more likely to bring threats or benefits to them (Malle, 1999). Of 
course, audience members don’t usually anticipate interacting with a story character, but as 
posited in the Media Equation (Reeves & Nass, 1996) people typically use the same mental 
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strategies to process media that they use to process other social actors in real life. This is also 
supported by research on parasocial interaction, in which audience members develop a one-way 
relationship with media characters, extending the media experience to real life relationships 
(Cohen, 2014; Klimmt, Hartmann, & Schramm, 2006; Tsay & Bodine, 2012). So we could 
anticipate that audience member’s thinking would tend to correspond to the actor and observer 
roles even for vicarious experiences.  
Intentional behaviors are usually explained by “reasons” related to personal dispositions 
or motivations, whereas unintentional behaviors are explained by impersonal “causes”. There are 
two typical kinds of reasons to explain intentional behaviors—causal history of reasons and 
subjective reasons. “Causal History of Reasons” (CHR) corresponds to traditional attribution 
factors including stable dispositions and situational factors. These are factors lying in the 
background of reasons. CHR precedes reasons and clarifies how these reasons came about. Malle 
(1999) labels the second kind of reasons “subjective reasons” reflecting people’s desires, beliefs, 
and values. These inner states are combined to form certain intentions, which ultimately lead to 
intentional acts. For example, a “causal history of reason” explanation for why a character helped 
someone whose bicycle chain was jammed could be that he/she is a nice person (a disposition). 
On the other hand, if the character expects some kinds of reward for being helpful that would be 
a “subjective reason” reflecting his/her desires and intentions.   
Unintentional behaviors usually are not consciously performed with a goal or plan in 
mind (Malle & Knobe, 1997); thus, it makes no sense to attribute them to reasons. People tend to 
rely on mechanical causes that brought about the unintentional behaviors as explanations. 
“Mechanical cause” explanations refer to using impersonal factors that are external to an actor to 
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explain the actor’s behaviors. For example, a character helped someone fix his bicycle chain 
because the chain is jammed or because the character happened to have the tools with him/her. 
Linking these different types of explanations to actor/observer’s focus of attention, 
actors tend to focus on unintentional behaviors and use “mechanical causes” to explain these 
behaviors whereas observers tend to focus more on intentional behaviors. Since actors have more 
access to their own beliefs, values, and desires compared to observers and want to justify their 
behaviors, actors tend to use more “subjective reasons” to explain their intentional behaviors. In 
contrast, observers usually do not have access to an actor’s internal states, so observers tend to 
use more “causal history of reasons” over “subjective reasons”. Overall, among the different 
types of explanations, relying more on the “mechanical causes” and “subjective reasons” 
indicates an actor’s perspective, whereas relying more on “causal history of reasons” and 
“intentional behaviors” indicates an observer’s perspective. 
Therefore, I propose actor-observer perspective is a multi-dimensional concept that has 
multiple elements: (1) Imagining one’s own mental states in the simulated situation and 
projecting them to the character, which is labeled “egocentric projection”. Greater egocentric 
projection indicates an actor’s perspective. (2) Understanding from the character’s perspective, 
which indicates an actor’s perspective. An actor’s perspective also includes elements of 
explaining behaviors using (3) mechanical causes and (4) subjective reasons. An observer’s 
perspective includes elements of explaining behaviors using (5) causal history of reasons and (6) 
intention judgment.  
The current study does not intend to conceptualize actor’s perspective and observer’s 
perspective as the two extremes on the same continuum. In fact, they should not be 
operationalized by one single scale because although they represent different ways of 
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understanding story characters, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive processes. It may 
oversimplify the mechanisms of actor-observer perspective if we consider them as opposed to 
each other. People can have low levels of both actor’s and observer’s perspective because they 
have no interest in understanding the character at all, or simply apply existing stereotypes or 
direct perception to interpret character’s behaviors without involving any types of perspective 
taking processes. In addition, the elements proposed above focus on audience’s general 
perspective taking experience in processing the whole story rather than moment-to-moment 
tracking of audience’s perspective taking strategies. Audience members may switch their way of 
perspective taking during narrative processing—taking an actor’s perspective at some moments 
and an observer’s perspective to interpret the same character at other moments. Therefore, 
although the six elements may be somewhat related, each of them functions as a unique 
mechanism of the actor-observer perspective.  
Based on this conceptualization, I will further explore the determinants and 
consequences of taking an actor or an observer perspective in processing narrative messages in 
the following sections.  
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Chapter 3: Factors Influencing Actor-Observer Perspective and the Effects of Character 
Morality 
To understand how the actor’s and observer’s perspective plays a role in story 
comprehension, it is important to identify what are the determinants of taking an actor’s or an 
observer’s perspective in narrative processing. Research on attribution indicates that the mental 
strategies people use in social judgments depend on the observed person’s perceived morality 
(Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Reeder & Spores, 1983). Extending this to how audiences judge story 
characters, in this chapter, I investigate the effects of character morality on the different aspects 
of actor-observer perspective. Based on the conceptualization in Chapter 2, there are six related 
but distinct elements of actor-observer perspective in understanding story characters: (1) 
egocentric projection onto the character, (2) understanding from the character’s 
perspective/identification, explaining behaviors with (3) mechanical causes, (4) subjective 
reasons, (5) causal history of reasons and (6) making intention judgment. Through two studies 
(Study 1 & Study 2), this chapter provides empirical evidence explaining how character morality 
influences each of these elements and whether processing moral characters leads to taking the 
actor’s perspective compared to processing immoral characters. 
Background 
Previous research has shown that the temporal and geographic distance of the event, 
perceived similarity with the story character, and narrative point-of-view all influence which 
type of perspective people are likely to take. Studies found that people tend to recall their recent 
memories from the actor’s perspective and recall distant memories from the observer’s 
perspective (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Talarico et al., 2004); describing 
actions more abstractly makes people more likely to picture the actions from the third-person 
 
 
 
 18 
perspective (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009); processing a character that is similar to the self 
can prompt people to take an actor’s perspective in interpreting the character’s mental states, 
regardless of whether the perceived similarity naturally occurs (e.g., similar identity or 
membership, Ames, 2004a; Kaufman & Libby, 2012; Van Boven, Loewenstein, Dunning, & 
Nordgren, 2013) or manipulated (e.g., similar personal traits, Houston, 1990; Krebs, 1975); and 
first person narratives using first-person (I) and second-person (you) pronouns make people more 
likely to comprehend the event from an actor’s perspective, and third person narratives using 
third-person pronouns (he/she) are more likely to induce understandings from an observer’s 
perspective (Brunyé et al., 2009). 
We should note that the major differences between real social interactions and media 
narratives derive from the features of the narrative message. If the actor-observer distinction 
from the social cognitive literature can be applied to processing narratives, some narrative-
related features should influence the audience member to take more of an actor’s or more of an 
observer’s perspective.  
An important message factor regarding features of story characters is character morality. 
People are particularly concerned with attributes of morality when forming impressions of media 
characters and people in real life (Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012; 
Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Raney & Bryant, 2002; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 
1998). To avoid potential harms from evil people and to seek for opportunities and help from 
kind people, people need to make moral judgments about others’ moral status in real social 
interactions. Similarly, when processing stories, it is audience’s primary goal to determine 
whether the character is good or bad. Audience members are “untiring moral monitors” who 
keep track of the moral correctness of a character’s actions (Zillmann, 2000). In the media 
 
 
 
 19 
psychology literature, a story character’s morality has been linked to many aspects of media 
experiences, including audience members’ affective disposition toward the character (Zillmann, 
2000; Zillmann & Bryant, 1975), enjoyment of the media content (Raney, 2004, 2006; Tsay & 
Krakowiak, 2011), perceived similarity between the self and the character (Grubb & Harrower, 
2008), parasocial relationship (Hoffner, 1996), and identification with the character (Tal-Or & 
Cohen, 2010).  
However, insufficient attention has been paid to the mental processes and mental 
inference strategies audience members use to understand moral or immoral media story 
characters. Although extensive research has done in the area of media entertainment to 
investigate how people psychologically react to characters, its emphases are on how people judge 
the morality of the character, how people develop feelings towards or form affiliations with 
moral or immoral media characters and why people enjoy stories based on such affiliations 
(Raney, 2004). When morality is judged, how they interpret characters’ mental state and 
subsequent behaviors are less known.  
Effects of Character Morality on Actor-Observer Perspective  
Although there is no direct evidence of the relationship between character morality and 
actor-observer perspective, some studies are informative about how the moral status of a 
character influences the way she/he is perceived. First, the moral status of a character is an 
important source for forming affective dispositions toward a character. Affective disposition 
refers to feelings that viewers hold toward characters (Raney, 2004), i.e., “liking” or “disliking”. 
According to disposition-based theories of story processing, audience members generate positive 
feelings (i.e., liking) toward characters who behave morally and negative feelings (i.e., disliking) 
toward characters who behave immorally, in a relatively intuitive and automatic way (Raney, 
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2004). Motivated by the need for social connectedness and self-serving purposes, people wish to 
share more similarities with the desirable characters and become psychologically closer in 
relationship with liked characters (O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). 
Actor’s perspective taking enhances merging between the self and the character. Therefore, 
readers are motivated to take an actor’s perspective when processing a liked moral character, 
egocentrically projecting one’s own traits and mental states onto the liked character, or 
temporarily exchanging identity with the liked character and adopting what the character is 
thinking and feeling (McPherson Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000). At the same time, people want 
to distance themselves from immoral characters. So I predict processing moral characters will 
boost actor’s perspective whereas processing immoral characters will enhance observer’s 
perspective. 
Second, character morality also influences audiences’ judgment about the intention of an 
action. According to the Knobe Effect (Knobe, 2003), moral actions are more likely to be judged 
as unintentional while immoral actions are more likely to be judged as intentional (for a review 
see Lee & Shapiro, 2014). Since actors tend to look more at unintentional behaviors to explain 
events while observers tend to look more at intentional behaviors (Malle & Knobe, 1997), this 
suggests interpreting a character’s moral behaviors would be more associated with actor’s 
perspective whereas immoral behaviors would be more associated with observer’s perspective. 
Character morality on egocentric projection. People are more likely to egocentrically 
project onto a similar character compared to dissimilar characters (Ames, 2004b). People see 
themselves as more similar with desirable characters who engage in moral behavior and want to 
build closer relationships with moral characters (O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012; Robbins & 
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Krueger, 2005). This similarity motivates audience members to project their own thoughts and 
feelings onto moral characters when interpreting their actions. Therefore, I propose 
H1: Participants are more likely to egocentrically project their own thoughts and feelings when 
processing stories of moral characters than of immoral characters. 
Character morality on identification/understanding from the character’s 
perspective. While egocentric projection is a measure of how much people assume another 
person would think the same way they would in a situation, the “identification” tradition sees 
perspective taking as a kind of simulation of events from the character’s perspective. Although 
greater egocentric projection and greater identification with story characters are both associated 
with greater actor’s perspective, there are important differences in the underlying processes. 
Egocentric projection is a relatively fast and intuitive way of making mental inferences about the 
behaviors of other people. It activates a perceiver’s own way of thinking and projects it to the 
character. Identification, however, is a process in which people simulate the character’s mental 
states, rather than one’s own. When identifying with a character, an audience member 
temporarily deactivates her/his own mindset and adopts the character’s thoughts and feelings. 
Therefore, the direction of influence for egocentric projection is from self to character while 
identification is from the character to the audience member. 
Sullivan and Venter (2005) found one’s self-descriptions have greater overlap with 
representations of heroes compared to non-heroes, suggesting a tendency of wishfully including 
positive characteristics into the self and identifying with the heroic characters. Similarly, 
vicariously exerting a superhero’s power through video game playing could promote prosocial 
behaviors in real life (Rosenberg, Baughman, & Bailenson, 2013), which indicates that people 
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are likely to internalize the perspectives of superheroes or moral characters and merge with their 
identities. Therefore, I propose 
H2: People will have a higher level of identification with the character when processing stories 
of moral characters than immoral characters. 
Character morality on behavioral explanations. For several decades, investigators 
have known that people make different judgments about the causes of social behaviors 
depending on whether they are taking an actor’s or an observer’s role. Falling generally under 
the label “attribution theory” (also correspondence bias), the general picture is that people are 
more likely to think their own negative actions are a consequence of situations but others’ 
negative actions are a consequence of disposition—the reverse being true for positive actions 
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995). 
Malle and Knobe (1997) recently suggested that these causal attribution judgments are 
more complex than previously described by attribution theory. Malle advances a folk-conceptual 
theory in which the intentionality of the action is an important factor. As explained in Chapter 2, 
an actor needs to continuously monitor the surrounding situation within which he/she performs 
behaviors. Therefore, actors are more attentive to their own unintentional actions because these 
behaviors are more salient in their minds (Malle, 1999). Intentional actions are driven by actors’ 
own needs and desires and are more or less automatically performed, so actors do not need to 
consciously monitor one’s own goals and intentions while performing the behaviors (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). In contrast, other people’ intentional actions are particularly relevant to an 
observer’s communication goals, carry more informational value, and are more likely to bring 
threats or benefits to them. So observers usually pay more attention to intentional behaviors 
(Malle, 1999).  
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Since people perceive themselves to have closer relationships and shared mental states 
with moral characters, they are more likely to take an actor’s role (versus observer’s role) when 
inferring moral character’s mental states and explaining their behaviors. Taking into 
consideration of both the folk-conceptual theory of behavioral explanation and the literature 
regarding the relationship between character morality and actor-observer perspective, I 
hypothesize when processing moral characters, audience members may focus more on the 
characters’ unintentional behaviors; when processing immoral characters, audience members 
may focus more on the characters’ intentional behaviors. 
H3: When processing stories of moral characters, people attend more to unintentional activities 
of the character than intentional activities; in contrast, when processing stories of 
immoral characters, people attend more to intentional activities of the character than 
unintentional activities.  
Since mechanical causes are the only type of explanations for unintentional behaviors, 
actors overall use more mechanical causes to explain behaviors than observers. When processing 
moral characters, people are motivated to take an actor’s perspective, attending more to the 
characters’ unintentional behaviors and consequently, rely on mechanical causes to explain 
moral character’s behaviors. 
In contrast, audience members are more likely to take an observer’s perspective when 
understanding immoral characters in order to distance the self from the immoral character. The 
folk-conceptual theory of behavioral explanations suggests observers pay more attention to 
intentional behaviors than unintentional behaviors and use less mechanical causes to explain 
behaviors in general (Malle, 1999). Therefore, I propose 
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H4: People are more likely to provide mechanical causes to explain moral character’s behaviors 
than immoral character’s behaviors.  
According to the folk-conceptual theory of behavioral explanation (Malle, 2005), 
intentional behaviors are usually explained by “causal history of reasons (CHR)” related to 
personal dispositions or “subjective reasons” related to motivations. Actors are more likely to 
offer subjective reasons than CHRs. This is because actors have higher accessibility to their 
beliefs, values, and desires compared to observers. Actors also want themselves to appear 
rational for engaging in an action by offering subjective reason explanations (Malle, Knobe, 
O'Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 2000) while observers may prefer using causal history of reasons 
to explain others’ behaviors by focusing more on their dispositional features than motivations. 
For example, a helping behavior explained by an actor might be more likely to be “because I 
want to help the person in need” (subjective reasons), whereas an observer might be more likely 
to explain “because she is a nice person” (CHR). Therefore, I propose 
H5: People are more likely to provide subjective reasons to explain moral character’s intentional 
behaviors than immoral character’s intentional behaviors. 
H6: People are more likely to provide causal history of reasons (CHR) to explain immoral 
character’s intentional behaviors than moral character’s intentional behaviors. 
Two studies were conducted to examine the effects of character morality on egocentric 
projection and identification (Study 1) and how audience members generate different patterns of 
behavioral explanations (Study 2) when processing moral and immoral characters. One concern 
is answering either the open-ended questions about behavioral explanations or the close-ended 
questions about projection or identification first might influence responses to the other part of the 
study. Therefore, I tested perspective taking indicated by egocentric projection and identification, 
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and behavioral explanations separately using different groups of subjects through two studies. 
These studies present the first attempt to link a character’s morality to mental inference strategies 
about character behavior. 
Study 1 
A randomized experiment was conducted to examine the influences of a character’s 
morality on actor-observer perspective, using a 2×2 (Story [Steve/Alice] × Morality 
[moral/immoral]) between-subject factorial design. Audience’s level of egocentric projection and 
identification were measured as the dependent variables reflecting the tendency to take an actor’s 
perspective. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and sixty-four adult American participants were recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and directed to our experiment conducted on Qualtrics.com. The 
participants were required to be native English speakers located in the USA, and have a high 
Mturk approval rate (>95%) to ensure the quality of their responses. Participants who completed 
the study had thirty cents deposited in their Amazon accounts through Mturk. The average time 
for completing the study was around 5 minutes, and 2 1/2 minutes was considered the minimum 
time it would take to listen to, read, and respond to the study. Two participants took less time, 
and another two participants did not fully complete the study. I removed these participants 
resulting in a final analytic sample of 160 participants. The sample contained 48.5% male 
participants and 51.5% female participants. The majority of participants were non-Hispanic 
White (53.8 %), followed by Asian (26.9%), African American (11.3%), Native American 
(3.1%), Latino (1.9%), and others (3%). The average age of participants was 34. 
 
 
 
 26 
Story Stimuli 
Two different stories (Alice’s and Steve’s) were used to test the hypotheses. However, it 
is not intended as a manipulation of story context. The goal is to examine the generalizability of 
the proposed theories and whether the same conclusions could apply to stories varying in 
characters and contexts. Since this is not a factor of focus in this study, its effects are discussed 
in the post-hoc analysis.  
The Alice story took place on campus, and the Steve story was a working scenario. 
Detailed descriptions of the stories are provided in the next section. Using two stories with 
different characters and storylines gives some assurance that any effects of morality 
(manipulated somewhat differently in each story) on perspective taking are not unique to a 
particular story. I purposely used one male character and one female character to reduce the 
possibility of our results being a function of effects related to gender, such as gender 
identification. 
Procedure and Manipulations 
Each participant was randomly assigned to listen to and later answer questions about one 
of the four stories (Steve moral: 1min 32s; Steve immoral: 1min 33s; Alice moral: 1 min 05s; 
Alice immoral: 1 min 09s). Using audio stories made it less likely participants could skip reading 
the story and also controlled for differences in reading speed. Each story began with the morality 
manipulation event in which Steve or Alice was described as intentionally doing something 
morally positive or morally negative in the past. Transcripts of the story stimuli are provided in 
Appendix A. Following the manipulation event, participants listened to an ambiguous event in 
which Steve or Alice got involved unintentionally.   
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Character’s morality. Morality was manipulated by depicting whether the character 
intentionally did a morally good or bad thing. The story depicting Steve as a moral character first 
described him voluntarily tutoring for a math class to help the students get better grades, while 
the story depicting Steve as an immoral character described him selling test answers for a math 
class to make money. The story depicting Alice as a moral character first described her 
voluntarily helping her weaker classmates with their chemistry lab experiments resulting in a 
higher average grade, while the story depicting Alice as an immoral character described her 
manipulating a chemistry lab to lower her classmates’ grades and make her grade higher. The 
unintentional event for Steve described him encountering his boss who asked about their work 
team’s progress. The boss was very impressed and hinted that Steve had a great chance for 
promotion. The unintentional event for Alice described her encountering her professor whose 
bicycle chain had jammed. She helped the professor fix the chain, and the professor was very 
grateful for her help. The stories and questions were adapted from Ames’ study (Ames, 2004a). 
Full versions of the stories are available from the first author.   
After listening to the story, participants watched a 45-second distractor video introducing 
how to clean burned-on food off a pot. They were instructed to count the number of times 
“yellow gloves” appeared on the screen and the number of times the narrator mentioned “baking 
soda”. The purpose of the distractor task is to engage participants’ attention away from the main 
task and ensure responses are not just dependent on short-term memory. 
Measures 
In Study 1, I focused on identification and egocentric projection.  
Egocentric projection. I modeled Ames’ (2004a) method by using eight items to 
measure participant’s assessment of the character’s mental states and then using parallel 
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questions about the participant’s assessment of their own mental state if they were in the same 
situation as the character. The presentation order of the questions within each type of question 
was randomized. Examples of the questions rating the character were: “Steve wanted to share 
credit with the others”; “Steve believed this was a great opportunity to advance his career”; 
“Steve didn’t really care what happened to his teammates”; “Alice hoped she would get a better 
grade for helping”; “Alice was sad to see someone struggling”; “Alice thought the professor was 
dumb for not being able to fix the bike alone”.  
The questions were modified for participant’s assessment of their own mental state if 
they were in the same situation as the character. For example, “I would believe this was a great 
opportunity to advance my career” and “I would not really care what happened to my 
teammates”. 
To obtain a measure of egocentric projection, the correlation coefficient between the 
eight judgments about the character and the eight parallel statements about the self was used. 
Higher values indicate greater egocentric projection. This measure is validated by Ames (2004a) 
and applied in other studies (Zhou & Shapiro, 2014). 
Identification. Identification was measured with 5-item identification scale (Tal-Or & 
Cohen, 2010). Items include statements about understanding the character, understanding the 
events in a way similar to the character, having similar feelings to the character, being able to get 
“inside the character’s head”, and understanding why the character did what he did. For example, 
“During reading, I could really ‘get inside’ Alice’s head”, “I felt like Alice felt” and “I tend to 
understand why Steve did what he did”. Participants rated to what extent they agreed or 
disagreed with each statement on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Responses were averaged into an identification scale (Cronbach’s α = .82; M = 4.91, SD = 1.11). 
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Manipulation Check  
A pretest was conducted among 60 participants. Each participant read one story about 
Steve and one story about Alice. One of the stories was randomly assigned to be the moral 
version, and the other was the immoral version. I compared participants who read the moral story 
for that character to the participants who read the immoral story for that character. Independent 
sample t-tests showed for both Steve and Alice’s stories, the characters manipulated to be more 
moral were indeed judged more moral (MSteve = 5.53, SD = 1.03; MAlice = 6.18, SD = .72) than 
when the character conducted immoral behaviors (MSteve = 3.44, SD = .99; MAlice = 3.08, SD = 
1.02), tSteve (58) = -7.99, p < .001, tAlice (58) = -13.42, p < .001, indicating that the morality 
manipulation worked. 
Results 
Study 1 tested hypotheses 1 and 2, which predict that people are more likely to 
egocentrically project their own thoughts and feelings to the character (H1) and identify with the 
character (H2) when processing stories of moral characters than of immoral characters. The 
result of a t-test showed a significant main effect of morality on the level of egocentric 
projection, t(161)=-3.42, p=.001. People tend to project themselves more onto moral characters 
(M = 0.47, SE=.05) than immoral characters (M = 0.20, SE=.06). Therefore, hypothesis 1 is 
supported.  
As for identification, there was a main effect of character morality on identification with 
the character, t(158)=-2.41, p = .017. People will have a higher level of identification with moral 
characters (M = 5.18, SE=.12) than immoral characters (M = 4.76, SE=.13). Thus hypothesis 2 is 
supported. 
Egocentric projection and identification were modestly related, r(158) = .27, p = .001. 
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Post-hoc Analysis 
A 2 (Morality: moral vs. immoral) ×2 (Story: Alice vs. Steve) ANOVA was performed to 
test whether different stories will influence the effects of morality on egocentric projection and 
identification. Treating the two stories as a between-subject factor eliminated the possibility of 
carry-over, practice and sensitization effects at the cost of some statistical efficiency—
motivating a somewhat larger number of participants (Greenwald, 1976). This is a more 
conservative approach to test generalizability compared to within-subject experimental designs. 
There was a trend for story context to influence egocentric projection, F (1, 156) = 3.59, p 
= .06, η2p = .02. People were somewhat more likely to egocentrically project onto Alice’s story 
(M = 0.41) than Steve’s story (M = 0.26). But the interaction of morality and story context on 
egocentric projection was not significant, F (1, 156) = 0.46, p = .50, η2p = .003. 
There was no main effect of story context on identification, F (1, 156) = 0.02, p = .88, η2p 
< .01. Its interaction effect with character morality on identification was also not significant, F 
(1, 156) = 1.84, p = .18, η2p = .01. These results indicate that the impacts of character morality on 
egocentric projection and identification with story characters hold across different story contexts 
and with different story characters. The findings are largely generalizable.  
Discussion 
In Study 1, participants were more likely to egocentrically project their own mental states 
onto moral characters and to identify with moral characters. One interpretation is that an 
audience member processing a moral media character is more likely to take an actor’s (as 
opposed to observer’s) perspective than when processing an immoral media character. These 
findings indicate that how an audience member understands a media character depends on the 
character’s moral status. As the first attempt to examine the influence of character morality on 
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actor-observer perspective, this study contributes to a better understanding of the role of 
character morality in narrative processing and conditions under which people would use different 
mental inference strategies to understand a media character. 
However, the literature on actor-observer asymmetry indicates that whether an audience 
member sees himself as an actor or observer also influences the kinds of explanations that the 
audience member looks for to explain the causes of a character’s behavior. To further explore 
effects of the moral status of a story character, I conducted a second study focusing on the impact 
of character morality on audience members’ explanations for the character’s behavior.  
Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and ten adult American participants were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk using the same recruiting criteria as in Study 1 and again directed to the 
experiment on Qualtrics.com. I checked participants’ Mturk ID to make sure participants in 
Study 1 did not participate in the second study. I excluded four participants who entered 
irrelevant information in the thought-listing task (careless participation), and two participants 
who didn’t complete the questionnaire. The sample contained about the same number of males 
(49.8%) and females (50.2%). The majority of participants were non-Hispanic White (62.6%), 
followed by Asian (21.6%), African American (8.7%), Latino (2.7%), Native American (1.7%) 
and other (2.7%). The average age of participants was 35.   
Procedure and Manipulations 
Study 2 followed similar procedures and used the same stimulus materials as in Study 1, 
but had different measures. After listening to the stories, participants were instructed to answer a 
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series of open-ended questions, including recall of the main behavioral event of the story, and 
explaining why the event took place. 
Measures 
Behavioral explanations. How people explained character’s behaviors were captured 
through open-ended questions. Participants were instructed to recall the story about Alice or 
Steve. First, they needed to identify and briefly describe the main behavioral event (only one 
event), and then explained in detail why Steve/Alice did that. Participants’ responses were coded 
by a team of three undergraduate research assistants. Each behavioral event identified was coded 
into two categories: intentional or unintentional. Since each story is composed of two behavioral 
events, starting with the morality manipulation event in which Steve or Alice intentionally did 
something moral or immoral and followed by an event in which Steve or Alice got involved 
unintentionally, if participants identified the morality manipulation event as the main behavioral 
event, it was coded as “intentional” and if participants identified the other event as the main 
behavioral event, it was coded as “unintentional”. Subjects’ explanations were counted into three 
categories based on Malle’s (2014) online coding scheme: the number of (1) mechanical causes 
(e.g., Alice helped the professor because she saw him in trouble with the bicycle; Steve told the 
boss about their team’s solution because the boss asked him); (2) subjective reasons (e.g., Alice 
wants to leave a good impression to her professor; Steve wanted to get a promotion); (3) causal 
history of reasons (e.g., Alice is a nice person; Steve is hardworking). Coders double-coded half 
of all the thoughts. The inter-coder reliability of each coding decision was acceptable 
(Krippendorff's αevent = 1; Krippendorff's αcause= .87; Krippendorff's αreason= .68; Krippendorff's 
αCHR= .83). Coders discussed and resolved all the disagreements. In general, subjective reason 
explanations (M = .47, SD = .61, n = 49) were most frequently mentioned by respondents.  
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Results 
Event identification. To test our third hypothesis that people attend more to 
unintentional events when processing moral characters and intentional events when processing 
immoral characters, I conducted a Chi-square test since both the dependent variable “event 
identified” (intentional vs. unintentional) and the independent variable character morality (moral 
vs. immoral) are dichotomous variables. Chi-square analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
character morality, χ2 (1, N=103) = 18.47, p < .001. Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, when 
people processed moral characters, they were more likely to attend to unintentional events (78%) 
than intentional events (22%). In contrast, when people processed immoral characters, they 
allocated more attention to intentional events (64%) than unintentional events (36%). Therefore, 
hypothesis 3 is supported. 
 
Figure 1. Effect of Character Morality on the Type of Event Identified (Study 2) 
Cause explanations. The fourth hypothesis posits that people are more likely to provide 
mechanical causes to explain a moral character’s behaviors than an immoral character’s 
behaviors. As predicted, results showed a main effect of “morality” on the number of cause 
explanations provided, F (1,100) = 14.81, p < .001, η2p = .13. Audience members provided more 
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cause explanations for moral characters (M = .45, SE = .06) than immoral characters (M = .11, 
SE = .06). Thus, hypothesis 4 is supported.  
Subjective reason explanations. Since it does not make sense to explain unintentional 
events with reason explanations, I only included participants attending to intentional behaviors, 
resulting in an analysis with considerably fewer participants than other analyses. Results show 
the main effect of “morality” on the number of subjective reason explanations was not 
significant, F (1,40) = 3.03, p=.09, η2p =.07, rejecting hypothesis 5. However, interpretation of 
this null effect should keep in mind that the coding strategy may not be reliable and sensitive 
enough to measure participants’ subjective reasons for such a small sample size. Indeed, a power 
analysis indicated this analysis is under powered (1 - β = 0.40). It merits further exploration on 
how to measure subjective reasons and how it is influenced by character morality.  
Causal history of reason (CHR) explanations. Similar to reason explanations, I only 
included participants attending to intentional behaviors in this analysis. Hypothesis 6 predicts 
that people will provide more CHRs for immoral characters than moral characters. It is found 
that character morality did not make a significant difference on the number of CHRs people 
generated for character’s behaviors, F (1,40) = 0.92, p> .10, η2p = .02. Therefore, H6 was 
rejected. But we should keep in mind this non-significant result may also be a consequence of 
under-powered analysis.  
Post-hoc Analysis 
Following the same procedure in Study 1, a 2 (Morality: moral vs. immoral) ×2 (Story: 
Alice vs. Steve) ANOVA was performed to test whether the findings are generalizable to 
different story contexts. The two stories did not moderate the effects of character morality on the 
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tendency of making cause explanations, F (1,100) = 1.68, p > .10, η2p = .02, or subjective reason 
explanations for character’s behaviors, F (1,40) = 1.48, p > .10, η2p = .04. 
However, there was a significant interaction between morality and story context on the 
number of causal history of reasons (CHRs) people generated, F (1,40) = 6.13, p= .02, η2p = .13. 
When processing Steve’s story, portraying him as an immoral person made people generate more 
CHRs (M = .37, SE = .12) compared to portraying him as moral (M = .14, SE = .15), consistent 
with hypothesis 6. However, the reverse happened to Alice’s story. Moral Alice made people 
generate more CHRs (M = .50, SE = .20) than immoral Alice (M = .01, SE = .09). This result 
contradicts hypothesis 6. Story contexts did make a difference in how people attribute casual 
history of reasons for moral or immoral characters. One explanation for the contradictory 
findings is that the event in Alice’s story: helping her professor fix his bicycle chain is overall a 
positive event whereas the event in Steve’s story: reporting the team’s progress to his boss is a 
neutral event. People may be likely to attribute a moral character’s benign action to the person’s 
moral characteristic and past helping behaviors but unlikely to relate this benign action to an 
immoral character’s personality or past behaviors. The nature of this event eliminates the 
possibility of using CHRs to explain immoral character’s positive behaviors because their 
personalities or past behaviors are not consistent with the current behavior. Further studies 
should use neutral events rather than positive- or negative-valenced behavioral events to test the 
effects of character morality on attribution to causal history of reasons to avoid this confounding 
effect. 
Discussion 
In study 2, I find character morality also predicted how people attend to and interpret a 
character’s behavioral events. For moral characters, people focus more on unintentional events 
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and subsequently explain them by providing more impersonal causes. For immoral characters, 
people focus more on their intentionally conducted events and explain these behaviors by 
analyzing their subjective reasons.  
These results are consistent with folk-conceptual theory in that actors (/observers) attend 
more to unintentional (/intentional) behaviors, and mechanical causes are used to explain 
unintentional behaviors. However, the results are inconsistent with the hypotheses for explaining 
intentional behaviors. A paired-samples t-test shows, regardless of the morality of the character, 
people used more reason explanations (M = 0.47) than causal history of reasons (M = 0.21) to 
explain intentional behaviors, t(103) = 2.93, p = .004. In the current study, actor and observer’s 
perspective is linked to the morality of the character. So I can only compare how actors explain 
character’s moral behaviors and how observers explain character’s immoral behaviors. In this 
case, the results make sense because actors want to emphasize their rationale and deliberation for 
a moral behavior and observers want to emphasize the agent’s responsibility for an immoral 
behavior. So both actors and observers would provide more subjective reason explanations than 
causal history of reason explanations.  
One limitation of this study is there is an alternative explanation for the findings that 
people attend more to intentional events and offer more reason explanation for immoral 
characters. Since morality is manipulated by depicting the character as conducting morally 
undesirable behaviors, an immoral character is inherently linked with a negative event. 
Negativity bias could be the alternative explanation for the attention and explanation 
asymmetries. Negativity bias refers to the phenomenon that negative events have a greater 
impact on people’s perception and psychological states compared to neutral and positive events 
(Rozin & Royzman, 2001). As people tend to pay closer attention to negative events for 
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diagnostic purposes (Carretié, Mercado, Tapia, & Hinojosa, 2001) and spend extra effort to 
analyze their reasons and intentions behind these negative behaviors to avoid self being harmed, 
audience members may attend more to immoral characters’ intentional behaviors. Further studies 
are needed to rule out this confounding factor and better explicate the main drive for the different 
attention and explanation patterns for moral and immoral characters. 
In summary, Study 1 and Study 2 show that morality of a story character influences how 
people understand the character’s mental states and behaviors. People tend to take an actor’s 
perspective when interpreting moral characters compared to immoral characters, showing higher 
levels of egocentric projection and identification, closer attention to unintentional behaviors, and 
providing more mechanical causes to explain these behaviors. 
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Chapter 4: Operationalization of Actor-Observer Perspective in Narrative Processing and 
the Role of Actor-Observer Perspective in Health-Related Narrative Persuasion 
A common method to distinguish the actor’s and the observer’s views in social 
psychology is to code participants’ thoughts, which is cumbersome and highly dependent on the 
specific context of the behavioral event. To better operationalize elements of actor-observer 
perspective in processing media stories, I propose and test the reliability and validity of the 
multi-dimensional measurements of actor-observer perspective (AOP). In Study 3, an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted using the same stories as in Study 1 and Study 
2 to explore the different dimensions of actor-observer perspective. In Study 4, a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) was conducted with stories in a health persuasion context about food 
safety to validate the multi-dimensional measurements of AOP. Construct validity was examined 
by confirming that these measures replicate earlier results in Study 1 and Study 2 showing the 
influence of character morality on actor-observer perspective. To establish discriminant validity, 
I compared AOP with transportation, a measure of the audience member’s overall engagement 
with the story. I posit AOP is a set of measures capturing audience’s mental inferences about 
characters and not a measure of narrative engagement. AOP provides us a new way of looking at 
narrative processing. Effects of the actor’s and the observer’s perspective on persuasion, 
specifically behavioral intentions to perform safe food handling practices, are also tested in 
Study 4. Understanding and being able to measure the consequences of actor/observer 
perspective can provide important insights into understanding how audiences process narrative 
characters. 
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Study 3 
Based on the conceptualization of actor-observer perspective and findings in Study 1 and 
Study 2, I aim to develop a set of scales measuring actor-observer perspective in processing story 
characters using three major dimensions: audience’s levels of egocentric projection, 
identification/understanding from the character’s perspective, and the type of explanations for 
character behaviors (including five sub-dimensions). 
Measurement of the first dimension regarding egocentric projection is guided by an 
existing measure of egocentric projection developed by Ames (2004a), which correlates audience 
members’ interpretation of the character’s mental states and their own mental states if they were 
in the same situation as the character. For example, in Study 1, participants rated whether they 
agree or disagree with eight statements about the character’s mental states and about their own 
mental states in the. Egocentric projection is calculated by the correlation coefficient between 
judgments about the character and about the self. However, this way of measuring projection is 
highly dependent on the specific context of the stimulus material. In addition, this measurement 
reflects the correlation between two sets of mental inferences which may have different 
psychometric properties than Likert-scales typically used in narrative processing studies. To 
develop a measure that can more easily be adapted to a variety of situations and stories, I used 
seven close-ended questions to capture the extent to which audience members use their own 
mental states to interpret the character’s mental states. 
The seven questions measure the similarity between one’s own and the characters’ 
thoughts, feelings, goals or intentions, behaviors, personality, and skills,  including: (1) The 
character's intentions are the same as mine would be in that situation; (2) The character is the 
same kind of person I would be in that situation; (3) The character is thinking what I would think 
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in that situation; (4) The character is feeling what I would feel in that situation; (5) The character 
has the same skills I would have in that situation; (6) The character acted the same way I would 
act in that situation; (7) The character has the same goals I would have in that situation. 
The dimension of identification is based on the short version of the identification scale 
developed by Tal-Or and Cohen (2010). It measures how audience members would put 
themselves in the shoes of the character, who is the actor of the story event, and understand the 
character’s mind from the actor’s point of view. Similar to egocentric projection, identification is 
an outcome of taking an actor’s perspective when processing narratives. Identification differs 
from egocentric projection in that when an audience identifies with a character, they take the 
character’s role, lose awareness of their own identity, and are less accessible to their own 
thoughts and feelings. The identification dimension includes questions of (1) I could really "get 
inside" the character's head; (2) I think I understand the character well; (3) I understood the 
events in the story the way the character understood them; (4) I tend to understand why the 
character did what he/she did; (5) I felt like the character felt. 
The behavioral explanation dimension is based on Malle’s (2014) coding scheme that 
categorizes people’s explanations into four different types: reason explanations, causal history of 
reason (CHR) explanations, capability explanations and mechanical cause explanations. Because 
judging a behavior as intentional or unintentional is the basis for behavioral explanation, I also 
included questions about intention judgment for this dimension. The traditional thought-listing 
method may work better in capturing the nuances of audience’s thoughts. However, complex 
coding instructions are time-consuming and difficult to code reliably as well as troublesome to 
apply to a variety of contexts. Close-ended Likert-scale questions may be conceptually clearer 
and more directly reflect the different types of explanations, as well as convenient in a variety of 
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contexts. Based on folk-conceptual theory of behavioral explanation, I developed 23 close-ended 
questions asking participants to rate to what extent they believe the character’s behavior was (1) 
intentional (e.g., The character was aware his/her actions would lead to his/her desired outcome; 
The character didn’t have any particular goal in mind, reverse coded), and caused by (2) 
subjective reasons (e.g., The character's actions were driven by his/her desires), (3) causal history 
of reasons (e.g., The character's actions were because he/she is that kind of person), (4) the 
character’s abilities (e.g., The character acted that way because he/she was capable of acting that 
way), and (5) mechanical causes (e.g., The character acted that way because he/she was 
confronted with this situation). 
Testing Construct Validity: Character Morality on Audience Perspective  
If the AOP scales are valid they should replicate the impacts of character morality on 
perspective taking found in previous studies. As I found in Study 1 and Study 2, taking an actor 
or observer’s perspective is influenced by characteristics of the narrative character. For example, 
in order to distance themselves from immoral characters, audience members are less likely to 
egocentrically project their own thoughts and feelings when understanding immoral characters or 
identify with the immoral characters. To establish construct validity of the AOP measures, I 
examine whether they are influenced by the morality of story characters. I propose 
H1: Using the new measurements, participants will report a higher level of egocentric projection 
when processing moral characters than immoral characters. 
H2: Using the new measurements, participants will report a higher level of identification with 
moral character than immoral characters. 
H3: Using the new measurements, participants reading about immoral characters will rate their 
actions as more intentional than participants reading about moral characters. 
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H4: Using the new measurements, participants will use more subjective reasons to explain moral 
character’s behaviors than immoral character’s behaviors. 
H5: Using the new measurements, participants will use more causal history of reasons (CHR) to 
explain immoral character’s behaviors than moral character’s behaviors. 
Testing Discriminant Validity: Relationship with Transportation 
Transportation is a process in which an audience member, like a traveler, transports 
him/herself to the narrative world, rendering the real world less accessible (Gerrig, 1993). When 
transported, the entire story (including its characters, setting, and plot) absorbs readers’ attention 
and emotions. Transportation is considered an important mechanism of narrative persuasion. 
Research has demonstrated that transportation enhances persuasion by reducing counterargument 
to the persuasive message (Green & Brock, 2000; Moyer-Gus & Nabi, 2010). Thus it is easier 
for the transported audiences to adopt story-consistent attitudes (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009; 
Slater, Rouner, & Long, 2006), promote behavioral intentions (Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, & 
Cappella, 2012) and actual behaviors (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007; Morgan, Movius, & Cody, 
2009; Schank & Berman, 2002).  
Which perspective people take in processing narratives is conceptually and empirically 
different from transportation. Actor-observer perspective focuses on audience member’s 
understanding of specific characters rather than the overall narrative experience. In fact, 
transported audience members could enter into the narrative world either as an actor or an 
observer, perceiving and interpreting the character from different perspectives. Thus, 
transportation may not be a good predictor for AOP, and these two constructs should not be 
strongly related to each other.  
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Identification, one dimension of actor-observer perspective, has been empirically 
distinguished from transportation. Tal-Or and Cohen (2010) found that the valence of 
information about a story character influenced the level of identification but not the level of 
transportation, whereas the time of deeds influenced the level of transportation but not the level 
of identification. However, no studies have examined the relationship between transportation and 
egocentric projection, or between transportation and actor-observer behavioral explanations. In 
this study, I would like to check the discriminant validity of the AOP scales by examining their 
relationship with the transportation scale. So I raise the following research question:  
R1: What are the relationships between different dimensions of AOP and transportation?  
Method 
Development of the AOP scales started from an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with 
204 participants exposed to two different story contexts. Construct validity was examined by 
confirming that these measures replicate earlier results showing the influence of the moral status 
of a media character on perspective taking. I also compared this scale to Green & Brock’s (2000) 
transportation scale to establish discriminant validity. 
Participants 
Two hundred and four adult American participants were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and directed to our experiment conducted on Qualtrics.com. The 
participants were required to be located in the USA, have a high MTurk approval rate (>95%) 
and have already participated in at least 100 studies to ensure the quality of their responses. 
Participants who completed the study had fifty cents deposited to their Amazon accounts through 
MTurk. The sample contained 49.50% male participants, and the majority of participants were 
non-Hispanic White (80.39%). The average age of participants was 39.19. 
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Procedure and Manipulations 
A randomized experiment was conducted to examine the influences of a character’s 
morality on actor-observer perspective, using a 2×2 (Story Contexts [Steve/Alice] × Character 
Morality [moral/immoral]) between-subject factorial design. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to listen to and later answer questions about one of the four stories (Steve moral: 
1min32s; Steve immoral: 1min 33s; Alice moral: 1 min 05s; Alice immoral: 1 min 09s). The 
story stimuli, manipulations, and procedures were the same as in Study 1. 
Measures 
A total of 35 items regarding actor-observer perspective were measured. The AOP scales 
initially include three major dimensions: egocentric projection, identification, and behavioral 
explanation. Behavioral explanation is further composed of five sub-dimensions: judgment of 
intentions, subjective reason explanations, causal history of reason explanations, capability 
explanations, and mechanical causes. Audience’ level of transportation into the narrative was 
also measured. 
Egocentric projection. I used seven close-ended questions to capture the extent to 
which audience members use their own mental states to interpret the character’s mental states. 
Participants rated their agreement with each statement on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 
= strongly agree). Sample questions include, “Steve has the same goals I would have in that 
situation”; “Steve is feeling what I would feel in that situation”; “Alice acted the same way I 
would act in that situation”. The presentation order of the questions was randomized. 
Identification. Identification was measured with a 5-item identification scale (Tal-Or & 
Cohen, 2010). Items include statements about understanding the character, understanding the 
events in a way similar to the character, having similar feelings to the character, being able to get 
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“inside the character’s head”, and understanding why the character did what he did. For example, 
“I could really ‘get inside’ Alice’s head”, “I felt like Alice felt” and “I tend to understand why 
Steve did what he did”. Participants rated to what extent they agreed or disagreed with each 
statement on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
Behavioral explanation. In the existing literature, behavioral explanations are usually 
measured by thought-listing tasks, in which participants write down their explanations for the 
character’s behaviors. Malle (2014) developed a coding scheme that categorizes participants’ 
explanations into four types: reason explanations, causal history of reason explanations, 
capability explanations and mechanical cause explanations. I added one more dimension to 
capture how audience members judge the intention of a character’s behavior. Based on folk-
conceptual theory of behavioral explanation, I developed a behavioral explanation scale, which 
consists of 23 close-ended questions asking participants to rate to what extent they believe (1) 
whether the character’s behavior was intentional, whether the character’s behavior was driven by 
(2) subjective reasons, (3) causal history of reasons, (4) the character’s capabilities, and (5) 
mechanical causes. Sample questions for each type of explanations include: “Steve did not intend 
what happened”; “Alice's actions were driven by her desires”; “Alice's actions were because she 
is that kind of person”; “Steve acted that way because she was capable of acting that way”. 
Participants rated to what extent they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a 7-point scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Transportation. Transportation was measured with a 5-item short form of transportation 
scale (Appel, Gnambs, Richter, & Green, 2015). Sample items include “I was mentally involved 
in the story while listening to it”; “The story affected me emotionally”; “While listening to the 
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story I had a vivid image of Alice”. Participants rated to what extent they agreed or disagreed 
with each statement on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Results 
The goal of an exploratory factor analysis is to discover the underlying structure of the 
AOP scale and identify items that clearly define each dimension. Principle components analysis 
with a varimax rotation of the 35 initial questions produced seven components meeting Kaiser’s 
criterion of eigenvalues greater than 1.0, explaining 66.23% of the variance. The seventh factor 
contained only one item loading higher than .50 and added little to the variance explained. One 
factor scale is usually not reliable. Also, the measurement model requires at least two indicators 
per latent variable to be identified, which means it is theoretically possible for the computer to 
derive a unique set of model parameter estimates. The seventh factor with a single item did not 
meet this criterion. Therefore, in the revised EFA, I removed the seventh factor and requested six 
factors. The selection criterion was to retain items with primary loadings greater than .50. 
Among the 35 items, two items (i.e., Alice/Steve has DIFFERENT skills than I would have in 
that situation; Alice's actions depended more on the situation than on personality) were removed 
from the final analysis because they had factor loadings lower than .50 on all of the six factors. 
Because large secondary loadings may indicate problematic items (Viswanathan, 2005, p. 185), I 
also eliminated items with a secondary loading greater than half its primary loading (nine more 
items were removed for this reason).  
The revised scale includes the remaining 24 items. The six factors explained 68.44% of 
the total variance. All items had primary loadings over .50. The final factor loading matrix is 
shown in Table 1. The six factors were easily interpreted: the first factor labeled “egocentric 
projection” contained six items measuring to what extent people used their own mental states to 
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interpret the character’s mind. Egocentric projection had an eigenvalue of 5.27, explaining 
21.97% of the variance (Cronbach’s alpha =.96). The second factor labeled “internal attribution” 
contained both causal history of reasons and subjective reasons items (7 items). It had an 
eigenvalue of 3.80, explaining 15.85% of the variance (Cronbach’s alpha = .84). The third factor 
labeled “intention judgment” contained three items measuring to what extent people perceive the 
character’s actions intentional. It had an eigenvalue of 2.03, explaining 8.46% of the variance 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .72). The fourth factor labeled “understanding from the character’s 
perspective” (or “understanding” for short) contained three identification items, measuring to 
what extent people could understand the character from the actor’s own perspective. It had an 
eigenvalue of 1.94, explaining 8.08% of the variance (Cronbach’s alpha = .72). I did not use 
“identification” to label this dimension to avoid confusions, as the original identification scale 
contains items indicating both actor’s and observer’s perspective taking. The fifth factor labeled 
“capability explanations” contained three items measuring to what extent people explain the 
character’s behavior by the character’s ability. It had an eigenvalue of 1.83, explaining 7.64% of 
the variance (Cronbach’s alpha = .70). The sixth factor labeled “external attribution” contained 
two items measuring to what extent people explain the character’s behavior by attributing to 
situational factors, corresponding to the mechanical cause type of behavioral explanations. It had 
an eigenvalue of 1.55, explaining 6.45% of the variance (two items; Cronbach’s alpha = .601). 
 
 
                                                
1 It is always encouraged to use multiple, heterogeneous indicators to enhance construct validity in the sense that it increases the 
likelihood of adequately identifying the construct of interest. In fact, I started with four items to measure the dimension of 
external attribution (or mechanical causes in Malle’s term). However, poor quality items were removed from the scale, leaving 
only two indicators for this dimension. Reliability of this two-item scale is calculated based on Cronbach’s alpha, which has 
restrictive assumptions and may underestimate the true reliability. The Spearman-Brown coefficient is equal or higher than the 
Cronbach’s alpha and is less biased, especially when the two items have a strong correlation. In the current analysis, I calculated 
both scores and they are almost the same: Cronbach’s alpha=.596, Spearman-Brown coefficient=.597. Therefore, I kept using 
Cronbach’s alpha to report reliability. 
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Table 1. Factor Loadings Based on a Principle Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation of 
the 24-item Actor-observer Perspective Scale (Study 3) 
 
 
1_Project
ion 
2_Interna
l 
3_Intenti
on 
4_Unders
tanding 
5_Capabi
lity 
6_ 
External 
The character's intentions are the same as mine would be in that 
situation. (Proj_3) 0.921 0.018 -0.108 0.089 0.096 0.089 
The character is the same kind of person I would be in that situation. (Proj_5) 0.898 0.074 -0.182 0.095 0.066 0.087 
The character is feeling what I would feel in that situation. (Proj_4) 0.891 0.006 -0.152 0.152 0.041 0.089 
The character acted the same way I would act in that situation. (Proj_6) 0.88 -0.02 -0.146 0.08 -0.018 0.145 
The character is thinking what I would think in that situation. (Proj_2) 0.88 0.008 -0.062 0.14 0.074 0.067 
The character has the same goals I would have in that situation. (Proj_1) 0.83 0.028 -0.02 0.217 0.091 -0.007 
The way the character acted is probably much like the way he/she acted in 
the past. (CHR_3) -0.088 0.781 0.07 0.148 0.124 0.009 
The character's actions were because he/she is that kind of person. (CHR_4) 0.027 0.77 0.195 0.074 0.264 -0.061 
The character's actions were driven by his/her beliefs. (SubReason_3) 0.074 0.736 0.077 0.062 0.045 0.036 
The character's actions were driven by his/her values. (SubReason_2) 0.263 0.696 0.059 0.092 0.08 -0.243 
The character's actions were because of his/her personality. (CHR_1) 0.003 0.675 0.223 0.151 0.272 -0.028 
The character would have acted that way even if the situation were 
somewhat different. (CHR_2) -0.084 0.648 -0.145 -0.013 0.096 -0.083 
The character acted that way because that’s how people like him/her act. 
(CHR_5) -0.011 0.638 0.153 -0.11 -0.068 0.425 
The character was aware his/her actions would lead to his/her desired 
outcome. (Intent_1) -0.117 0.068 0.788 -0.077 0.203 0.07 
The character's actions were driven by his/her desires. (Intent_2) -0.29 0.08 0.754 -0.005 0.014 0.004 
The character believed his/her actions would lead to his/her desired outcome. 
(Intent_3) -0.128 0.22 0.709 -0.017 0.199 -0.169 
While listening to the story, I could really "get inside" Steve's head. (Iden_1) 0.096 0.134 -0.022 0.827 0.054 -0.033 
I think I understand Steve well. (Iden_2) 0.267 0.127 -0.004 0.793 0.044 -0.035 
I understood the events in the story the way Steve understood 
them.  (Iden_3) 0.364 0.039 -0.099 0.632 0.004 0.253 
The character did what he/she did because he/she had the ability to do what 
he/she did in that situation. (Ability_1) -0.057 0.277 0.194 0.166 0.736 0.09 
The character acted that way because he/she had the tools to act that way. 
(Ability_2) 0.118 0.098 0.207 -0.019 0.693 0.207 
The character had the skill to get the outcome he/she wanted. (Ability_3) 0.215 0.265 0.029 -0.011 0.675 -0.035 
The character acted that way because he/she was confronted with this 
situation. (MechCause_2) 0.098 -0.003 -0.029 0.054 0.057 0.794 
The character's actions were because he/she was in that kind of situation. 
(MechCause_1) 0.309 -0.18 -0.066 0.041 0.237 0.682 
Note: Factor loadings < .2 are suppressed; 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; 
Factor 1: Egocentric projection; Factor 2: Internal attribution; Factor 3: Intention judgment; 
Factor 4: Understanding from character’s perspective; Factor 5: Capability explanations; Factor 
6: External attribution 
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A series of ANOVAs were performed to test hypotheses 1-5 about the impacts of 
character morality on the different dimensions of actor-observer perspective (Figure 2). 
Supporting H1, participants reported a higher level of egocentric projection onto moral 
characters (M=5.09, SE=0.13) than immoral characters (M=3.60, SE=0.12), F (1, 201) = 72.61, p 
< .001, η2p = .27. Character morality also had a significant impact on the level of understanding 
from the character’s perspective, F (1, 200) = 33.99, p < .001, η2p = .15. Participants reported 
greater understanding from the moral character’s standpoint (M=5.28, SE=0.10) than immoral 
character’s standpoint (M=4.46, SE=0.10), supporting H2.  
 
Figure 2. Effect of Character Morality on AOP Scales (Study 3) 
The third hypothesis predicts that people judge immoral character’s behaviors as more 
intentional compared to moral character’s behaviors. Results showed a significant main effect of 
morality on judgment of character’s intention, F (1, 200) = 28.42, p < .001, η2p = .12. People 
were more likely to interpret behaviors as intentional for immoral characters (M=5.48, SE=0.10) 
than for moral characters (M=4.74, SE=0.10). Therefore, H3 is supported.  
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H4 and H5 predict that people will provide more subjective reasons and less causal 
history of reasons (CHRs) for moral characters compared to immoral characters. However, since 
the items of subjective reasons and CHRs were loaded under one factor in the EFA, I was not 
able to examine these two hypotheses separately. One possibility is that both subjective reasons 
and CHRs attribute the character’s behavior to internal and personal factors, so they are 
empirically similar in explaining people’s behaviors. Subjective reasons and CHRs formed a new 
dimension of AOP, in which people attribute the character’s behaviors to internal factors. 
Character morality had a significant influence on the level of internal attributions, F (1, 199) = 
10.82, p = .01, η2p = .05. People were more likely to attribute moral character’s behavior to 
internal factors, providing more subjective reasons and causal history of reasons for moral 
characters (M=5.41, SE=0.09) than for immoral characters (M=5.02, SE=0.08).  
Although not hypothesized, external attributions and capability explanations emerged as 
two important dimensions of AOP and were influenced by character morality. There was a 
significant main effect of morality on external attributions, explaining character’s behaviors by 
situational factors, F (1, 199) = 5.01, p = .03, η2p = .03. People were more likely to provide 
situational factors to explain moral characters’ behaviors (M=5.04, SE=0.12) than to explain 
immoral characters’ behaviors (M=4.66, SE=0.12). Capability explanations were also influenced 
by character morality, F (1, 200) = 8.00, p = .005, η2p = .04. People are more likely to provide 
capability explanations for behaviors of moral characters (M=5.61, SE=0.08) than immoral 
characters (M=5.27, SE=0.08). The story context (whether it was Steve or Alice) did not 
significantly influence how participants explain the character’s behavior, nor did it interact with 
character morality on different types of behavioral explanations, ps>.05. 
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To investigate the research question (RQ1) about the relationship between transportation 
and the elements of the AOP, first, transportation was used as the dependent variable in the 
ANOVA model outlined above. As expected, character morality did not influence audiences’ 
level of transportation. Second, correlation coefficients were computed between transportation 
and the dimensions of the AOP. Transportation only had a significant relationship with the 
dimension of “understanding from the character’s perspective” (the three items from Cohen’s 
identification scale) (r=.34, p<.001).  There was also a significant correlation between egocentric 
projection and the five-item Cohen’s identification scale (r=.52, p<.001). There was no other 
significant relationship of transportation to any of the other dimensions—egocentric projection, 
intention judgment, internal attribution, external attribution, or capability explanations. 
Discussion 
Using multi-dimensional measures of actor-observer perspective, Study 3 largely 
replicated findings in Study 1 and Study 2, providing strong evidence for the construct validity of 
the AOP scales. People were more likely to interpret immoral character’s behavior as intentional 
and moral character’s behavior as unintentional. This is also consistent with Malle’s folk-
conceptual theory of behavioral explanations. People were more likely to egocentrically project 
onto and better understood moral characters than immoral characters. Overall, these results 
indicate that audience members are more likely to take an actor perspective for moral characters 
and an observer perspective for immoral characters, supporting the notion that different ways of 
presenting a story character can influence audience perspective taking.  
The results also confirm that these measures are distinct from at least one measure of 
engagement with a story—transportation. The only significant overlap between transportation 
and the dimensions of the AOP were with the items from Cohen’s identification scale. Previous 
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studies have found that manipulations of the valence of information about a story hero influenced 
identification (similar to the results here) but not transportation indicating that identification and 
transportation are distinct, although Tal-Or and Cohen do report a “marginally significant” (r 
= .22, p < .10) relationship (Tal-Or & Cohen, 2010, p. 411). 
The effect of morality on the internal and external attribution dimensions of AOP is not 
completely consistent with the traditional attribution theory or Malle’s (2005) folk conceptual 
theory of behavioral explanations. The differences appear to be at two levels. First, regarding the 
conceptual categorizations of behavioral explanations, results of our EFA was consistent with the 
classic attribution theory which identifies internal (dispositional factors) and external (situational 
factors) attributions as two different dimensions of explaining behaviors from actor or observer’s 
perspective. This result is not consistent with Malle’s conceptualization of folk behavioral 
explanation, which posits that both dispositional and situational factors belong to the type of 
causal history of reasons. In addition, Malle suggests subjective reasons is a different type of 
explanation from dispositional reasons, whereas in our study they were loaded under one 
“internal attribution” factor. 
 Second, regarding the effects of character morality on behavioral explanations, our 
results differ from both the traditional attribution theory and part of Malle’s folk-conceptual 
theory. Traditional attribution theory suggests actors tend to attribute their own behaviors to 
situational factors whereas observers tend to attribute others’ behaviors to dispositional factors 
(Jones & Nisbett, 1971). Malle and his coauthors (2007) predicts that actors are more likely to 
use subjective reasons to explain their behaviors, whereas observers are more likely to use 
dispositional and situational factors to explain others’ behaviors. This study suggests that people 
tend to take an actor’s perspective when processing moral characters, as a result, they use more 
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personal (including both dispositional and subjective reasons) as well as situational factors to 
explain a moral character’s behaviors, compared to an immoral character’s behavior. These 
differences may point to a possibility that although the mental strategies we use to process 
narrative characters largely parallel how we process social others in real interactions, there may 
still be some differences in the way social others and narrative characters are processed and 
understood. In Malle’s study, actor-observer position is manipulated by letting pairs of 
participants have interpersonal conversations then write done everything that was going on with 
their partner and with themselves. The events mentioned in the conversation (e.g., Why didn’t 
she speak to him? Why are you rushing?) were coded and used for measuring behavioral 
explanations. These events differ in nature from the events in my stimuli. First, in my study, the 
events were embedded in a narrative context. Second, taking an actor’s perspective in narrative 
processing does not require readers to have the same experience before, but an actor’s position in 
real life must be doing the behavior and have the experience of participating in the action. Third, 
vicarious participation in narrative events may require less cognitive effort compared to actual 
participation, so the differences between taking an actor’s perspective and an observer’s 
perspective in narrative processing may not be large enough compared to real social interactions. 
Also, the dimension of internal attribution includes both causal history of reasons and subjective 
reasons, complicating the meaning of this dimension and making it less efficient in indicating the 
actor-observer perspective.  
Nevertheless, the relative success of the measures developed in Study 3 indicates that 
further development of actor-observer perspective scales is merited. Therefore, Study 4 was 
conducted to further validate the scales. 
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Study 4 
Based on the results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis in Study 3, I conducted a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of the AOP scale using a separate sample in a different 
story context. Study 4 has three purposes: 1. to test the measurement model proposed in the 
Study 3; 2. to further explore the impacts of narrative features (i.e., first-person narratives, 
character vulnerability) on perspective taking; 3. to test the consequences of taking actor’s or 
observer’s perspective in the context of health-related narrative persuasion about food safety. 
Specifically, I will use the AOP scales to measure audience members’ perspective taking 
experience and examine how taking an actor’s or observer’s perspective influences people’s 
intention to do safe food handling practices. 
Context of the Study 
Study 4 is part of a larger research project examining the effects of personal narratives of 
foodborne illness on increasing people’s compliance with safe home food preparation practices. 
Foodborne diseases interfere with people’s normal living, working, or schooling and can even be 
life threatening. Each year 48 million Americans (approximately 17% of people in the United 
States) get sick because of foodborne illnesses, with 128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 deaths 
(Scallan, et al., 2011). Home contamination is estimated to be responsible for about 20% of 
foodborne illnesses. These infections are preventable if people recognized the importance of 
food safety issues and followed proper steps to prepare and store food.  
One strategy that has been found effective in increasing people’s risk perception and 
behavioral intention in other domains but not tested for food safety is to use first-person narrative 
messages from victims of food-borne illness or affected family members (De Wit, Das, & Vet, 
2008; Kim & Shapiro, 2016). The goal of this project is to examine the effectiveness of first-
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person narratives and explore message features that help enhance the narrative persuasion in 
food safety and other health contexts. In this study, the main story characters are the victims of 
food-borne illness who share their experience of suffering from food-related diseases. Therefore, 
how audience members react to the character largely depends on characteristics of the victim. 
Whether the character is vulnerable to the risk or not may play an important role in influencing 
whether the audience member takes an actor’s or observer’s perspective in processing the 
narrative, which may further impact the persuasive outcomes. In this specific context, children 
under five and people older than 50 are particularly vulnerable to foodborne illnesses because of 
their weak immune system. On the one hand, people tend to generate more intense emotional 
responses (e.g., sympathy) toward vulnerable characters than non-vulnerable characters. On the 
other hand, most people will not identify themselves with vulnerable characters. Limited 
research attention has been paid to what types of victims should be featured in a narrative to 
enhance the persuasive impacts on audience members. Therefore, besides testing the validity of 
AOP scales, this study also attempts to contribute to the current literature of narrative persuasion 
by examining the effects of character vulnerability and first-person accounts on increasing 
people’s intention to prepare food safely through the mechanism of taking an actor’s and 
observer’s perspective. 
Testing the AOP Scales 
Study 3 indicates that the actor-observer perspective scales are composed of six 
dimensions: egocentric projection, understanding from the character’s perspective, external 
attribution, intention judgment, internal attribution, and capability explanations. To replicate the 
previous results for internal consistency and to extend the validity tests, Study 4 uses a 
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persuasive narrative promoting safe food handling practices to test the fitness of the 
measurement model and predicts: 
H1: People’s responses to the actor-observer perspective scales will fit the measurement model 
and will be loaded under six factors:  egocentric projection, understanding from the 
character’s perspective, external attribution, intention judgment, internal attribution, and 
capability explanations. 
Impacts of First-person Narratives and Character Vulnerability on Actor-Observer 
Perspective 
 One form of a health narrative tested in a few contexts is a first-person or 
autobiographical account of illness. In first-person narratives, the narrator is the main character 
and tells the story from her/his own perspective. First-person accounts of illness have been used 
by investigators in two ways. First, they have been used to understand the person’s experience as 
reflected in the story they tell about their health issue (Gray, 2009). Secondly, first-person 
narratives have been found to be more effective than statistical evidence in changing perceptions 
of risk and behavioral intentions (De Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008). Such first-person accounts are 
evaluated more positively, are easier to understand, enhanced recall, reduced counterarguing and 
negative reactions, strengthened connection with the message source, increased relevant 
discussions, increased efficacy beliefs and influenced behavior in those generally hardest to 
reach, and have distinct ability to aid in prevention campaigns (Houston et al., 2011; Kreuter et 
al., 2010; McQueen & Kreuter, 2010; Miller-Day & Hecht, 2013). Some studies find that first-
person accounts appear to promote a sense of personal risk without the defensive processing that 
accompanies most threatening health messages (De Wit et al., 2008). More importantly, first-
person narratives may also activate self-related concepts and strengthen the association between 
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the self and the story (Zhou & Shapiro, 2017). This mechanism will make the story more 
engaging and make the audience more likely to take an actor’s perspective when processing first-
person narratives. Therefore, I hypothesize that 
H2: People will be more likely to take an actor’s perspective indicated by a) greater egocentric 
projection, b) greater understanding from the character’s perspective, making c) more 
external attributions and d) capability explanations, e) less internal attributions and f) 
intention judgments, when processing first-person stories than third-person stories. 
Features of the story character also influence how people interpret the character’s mental 
states. Stories of vulnerable populations such as children or elderly people often receive more 
attention than stories of healthy adults. One reason is that vulnerable people are in higher need 
for help and the consequence of an event on these people is usually more significant than that on 
general others. People may be more cognitively and emotionally engaged when processing 
vulnerable victim’s story and willing to interpret the event from the character’s perspective 
(Genevsky, Vastfjall, Slovic, & Knutson, 2013; Kogut, Slovic, & Västfjäll, 2016). However, 
people are unlikely to perceive themselves similar to the highly vulnerable characters. It is 
human nature to be egocentrically biased and reluctant to admit that we are vulnerable to health 
risks (Branstrom & Brandberg, 2010). Therefore, audience members tend to maintain separate 
identities from vulnerable populations and are likely to take an observer’s perspective. Few 
studies have compared the effects of using high or low vulnerable characters on perspective 
taking. Given the potentially contradictory predictions and the lack of empirical evidence, I raise 
the following research question: 
RQ1: Will people be more likely to take an actor’s perspective when processing story characters 
who are high in vulnerability than those low in vulnerability? 
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Effects of Actor-Observer Perspective on Behavioral Intention 
When processing narratives, audience members need to understand story characters who 
have different identities, and are in different temporal and spatial framework from the audience 
member. Perspective taking is an important mental strategy to read others’ thoughts (Epley, 
Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Marvin, Greenberg, & Mossler, 1976), infer other’s 
motives (Ames, 2004b), and feel others’ emotions (Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2011; 
Coplan, 2004). As explicated in Chapter 2, there are two types of perspective taking depending 
on whether the audience member imagines the events from the actor’s perspective who is 
actively performing the actions, focusing on the environment and objects that would interact with 
the actor, or views the event from an outside observer’s perspective, focusing on the person who 
carries out actions.  
The perspective through which a narrative is processed has important consequences on a 
reader’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. For example, Rall and Harris (2000) found that 
people have better comprehension and recall of a narrative presented from the perspective of the 
protagonist (an actor’s perspective) than from an observer’s perspective. And such enhanced 
comprehension of the first-person narrative may be a result of taking an actor’s perspective in the 
reader. Taking an observer’s perspective also has a function of distancing the reader from the 
specific event or context and reducing the intensity of story relevant emotions (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2006). In contrast, actor’s perspective taking usually leads to high degree of emotional 
reactivity (Brunyé et al., 2011) and self-referencing (de Graaf, 2014), relating the situation 
closely to oneself. For example, actor’s perspective produced more nervousness and emotionality 
(Terry & Horton, 2007), whereas observer’s perspective taking makes retrieving past pain 
memories less painful (McNamara, Benson, McGeeney, Brown, & Albert, 2005). Although these 
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findings are based on recalling one’s past experiences, it should also apply to processing stories 
of another person. Additionally, perceiving story characters through different perspectives also 
influences perspective taker’s behaviors. Jackson, Meltzoff, and Decety (2006) found that 
latency to imitate hand and foot change behavior in a conversation was significantly shorter 
when the behavior is shown from the actor’s perspective than from the observer’s perspective. 
This finding suggests that taking an actor’s perspective can activate corresponding sensory-
motor responses more easily than taking an observer’s perspective.  
In sum, actor’s perspective tends to facilitate story comprehension, enhance the intensity 
of emotion reactions, promote behaviors consistent with the character or the story theme, all of 
which help increase the persuasive effects of narratives. Particularly relevant to this study is the 
effect of actor-observer perspective on changing audience’s intention to prepare food safely. 
Behavioral intention is an important persuasive outcome that strongly predicts actual behavior 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Based on the narrative persuasion literature, people who are more 
engaged in the narrative world and more identify with the character hold stronger story-
consistent beliefs and intentions (Green & Brock, 2000; Igartua, 2010; Kim et al., 2012). 
Audience members with an actor’s perspective in processing stories have greater engagement 
with the overall story and identification with the character than audience members with an 
observer’s perspective. In fact, one dimension of the actor’s perspective taking: understanding 
from the character’s perspective is derived from the concept of identification. The actor’s 
perspective taking facilitates audience members to keep track of character’s goals and intentions, 
to form stronger bonds with the character, and to relate the behavioral event to themselves (de 
Graaf, 2014), making people more likely to adopt story-consistent behavioral intentions than the 
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observer’s perspective taking (Nan, Dahlstrom, Richards, & Rangarajan, 2015). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that 
H3: Taking an actor’s perspective when processing persuasive narratives increases audience 
member’s behavioral intention to do what is advocated by the story. 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
To test the measurement model and the consequences of actor’s and observer’s 
perspective taking, I recruited a total of 339 U.S. participants on Mturk and directed them to 
Qualtrics.com to complete a survey. Among them, the majority were White Americans (77.4%), 
followed by Asians (7.1%), African Americans (6.5%), Latinos or Mexican Americans (5.4%), 
Native Americans or other ethnic groups (3.6%). There were 45.2% male participants, and the 
average age was 38.40. 
In the study, participants were instructed to read a story about a victim who suffered from 
foodborne illness. They were randomly assigned to one of the four story conditions (see details 
below). The story describes a character’s experience of having a salmonella infection in a family 
gathering dinner because of cross contamination while preparing a chicken. The story is based on 
a true story and adapted from an interview produced by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Story stimuli are provided in Appendix B. After reading the story, participants answered 
a set of questions measuring their reading experience and behavioral intentions to perform food 
safety practices.  
Manipulation 
I manipulated the vulnerability of the main story character to foodborne illness and 
whether the story is told from the first-person or third-person perspective. In the high 
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vulnerability condition, the main character who suffered from salmonella is the 72-year-old 
grandma; whereas in the low vulnerability condition, the main character who suffered from 
salmonella is the 25-year-old granddaughter. In the first-person narrative condition, the narrator 
tells her own story; whereas in the third-person narrative condition, the narrator tells someone 
else’s story. For example, in the high vulnerability first-person condition, the grandma tells her 
own experience of suffering from salmonella. In the low vulnerability third-person condition, the 
grandma tells her granddaughter’s suffering of this foodborne illness. The cause, level of 
seriousness, and the consequences of the infection are the same. The length of these four stories 
is comparable. 
Measures 
Actor’s and Observer’s perspective taking. The six-dimensional measurements 
generated in Study 3 were used to measure actor-observer perspective. Actor’s perspective 
taking was indicated by four measures: egocentric projection, understanding the story from the 
character’s perspective, explaining the behavior by external factors, and explaining the behavior 
by the character’s abilities. Participants’ observer’s perspective taking was indicated by two 
measures: explaining the behavior by internal factors and intention judgment. I used the same 
items based on EFA in Study 3 to measure each dimension of actor-observer perspective. For 
example, six items measured to what extent people egocentrically project onto the main story 
character, including “The character is feeling what I would feel in that situation”.  Participants 
rated their level of agreement with each statement ranging from 1= “strongly disagree” to 7 = 
“strongly agree”.  
Behavioral intention. I measured behavioral intention through seven items asking how 
participants would prepare or store food in the future. Sample items include “I will use a food 
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thermometer the next time I prepare raw meat or chicken to make sure that the food is fully 
cooked”, “The next time when I prepare food, I will use one cutting board for fresh produce and 
a separate one for raw meat, poultry and seafood,” and “I will use or discard refrigerated food on 
a regular basis”. Participants rated their agreement with each statement along a 1-7 Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). I averaged the score of these seven items into a 
behavioral intention scale (Cronbach’s α = .82, M = 5.89, SD = .39).  
Results 
Data Preparation and Descriptive Statistics 
Outlier. Based on the Mahalanobis distance statistic, I identified a case that significantly 
deviates from the sample (MD=110.106, p<.05).  This participant only selected 1 or 7 for all the 
questions. Therefore, I deleted this outlier from the final analysis. 
Multivariate normality. Before conducting further statistical analysis, we need to make 
sure the dataset fulfills certain assumptions such as multivariate normality. Since univariate 
normality is “a necessary but not sufficient condition for multivariate normality to hold” 
(Stevens, 1996, p.243), I tested each variable’s normality first. Although all of the items have 
relatively low skewness index (<3.0) and kurtosis index (<8.0), nearly all variables have 
extremely small p-value in the Shapiro-Wilk's Normality Test (ps<.001), suggesting they are 
significantly different from the normal distribution, violating the univariate and multivariate 
normality assumptions. Instead of using a normal theory method such as Maximum Likelihood 
(ML), I used Robust Maximum Likelihood (MLR) to analyze the data. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Research Variables (Study 4) 
 
Note: Correlations are provided in the upper triangle of the matrix, variances are located on the diagonal, and covariances are reported in the lower 
triangle. 
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Table 2 reports the correlations, variances, and covariances of the research variables. I 
followed two-step modeling procedure to test the hypothesized model–––the first step tests the 
CFA measurement model (H1); the second step tests the structural regression (SR) model (H2, 
H3, & RQ1). I report indices of model chi-square (χ2), RMSEA, CFI, AGFI, and SRMR. Chi-
square tests the exact-fit hypothesis, which is goodness-of-fit statistic. Non-significant value (i.e., 
p>.05) indicates a good fit of the model to the data. RMSEA is a badness-of-fit index. Good fit 
models have RMSEA less than .05, with its lower bound less than .05, upper bound less than .10. 
CFI and AGFI values larger than .90, SRMR less than .08 indicate good fit. 
One-factor Measurement Model 
Although I conceptualize actor-observer perspective as composed of multiple 
dimensions, it should be determined whether the fit of a simpler, one-factor measurement model 
is comparable (Kline, 2011, p.234). So the very first step is to test this single-factor assumption. 
The factor loading of “Proj_1” is set to 1 in order to scale the latent variables. The overall fit of 
this one-factor model was poor (shown in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 3), because the chi-
square (χ2=2237.68, df=252, p<.001) is significant, the RMSEA (.15) is larger than .05, the 
lower bound of the 90% confident interval of RMSEA (.15) is larger than .05 and its upper 
bound (.16) is larger than .10. SRMR (.18) is larger than .08. Although AGFI (.92) is larger 
than .90, the CFI (.39) is very low and less than .90.  
In addition, not every link is significant. And among those significant links, some factor 
loadings are extremely low (around or below .05) for the indicators that measure understanding 
and external attribution. These results indicate discriminant validity among observed variables 
that they measure different factors. Therefore, I should reject this one-factor model and specify 
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the indicators under six factors–––projection, understanding from the character’s perspective, 
external attributions, internal attributions, intention judgment, and capability explanations. 
 
   Figure 3. One-factor Measurement Model (Study 4) 
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Baseline Measurement Model 
I set the factor loadings of “Proj_1”, “Iden_1”, “MechCause_2”, “CHR_1”, “Intent_1”, 
and “ability_1” to 1 in order to scale the latent variables. Model fit indices are shown in Table 3 
and illustrated in Figure 4. The chi-square (χ2=486.89, df=237, p<.001) is significant, the 
RMSEA (.06) is larger than .05, which indicate bad model fit.  
 
 Figure 4. Standardized Coefficients of the Baseline Measurement Model (Study 4) 
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However, the lower bound of the 90% confident interval of RMSEA (.05) is around .05, and 
its upper bound (.07) is less than .10, which are in the acceptable range. SRMR (.05) is less 
than .08 and both the CFI (.92) and AGFI (.97) are above .90. All of these indices indicate good 
fit. In addition, indicators loaded under the same factor show good convergent validity. All 
hypothesized paths are significant and positive. Except from three items (i.e., CHR_2, CHR_3, 
Ability_3), all standardized factor loadings are above or around .70 (Kline, 2011, p.116). The 
correlations between factors are moderate (the correlation between projection and understanding 
is .57, which is the highest) or low, which indicates discriminant validity. These mixed results 
indicate opportunities existed for improving the model.  
Revision of the Measurement Model 
First, I removed the three low factor loading items under the dimension of “internal 
attribution” and “capability explanations”. Two of the three items, CHR_2 and Ability_3, had 
consistently low factor loadings in both Study 3 and Study 4, ranking as the lowest or the second 
lowest item under the corresponding dimension. Although CHR_3 had a relatively high factor 
loading in Study 3, the result did not replicate in Study 4, suggesting this item may not be a 
reliable indicator of external attribution for different types of stories. Therefore, it is removed 
from the scale. Second, based on the size of contribution in decreasing chi-square indicated by 
modification indices and theoretical reasons, error covariances were added between 
SubReason_2 and SubReason_3, between Proj_5 and Proj_6, between CHR_1 and CHR_4, and 
between Proj_1 and Proj_3. The rationale for these modifications is that conceptually 
SubReason_2 and SubReason_3 capture the same sub-dimension of “subjective reasons” under 
“internal attribution”. Both CHR_1 and CHR_4 focus on the character’ personality to explain 
behaviors. Thus they may be commonly influenced by factors that are not specified by the 
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model. Proj_1, Proj_3, Proj_5, and Proj_6 are all loaded under the latent factor of “projection”. It 
is reasonable that audiences may be influenced by unspecified factors that affect both projecting 
one’s goals and thoughts onto the characters, and projecting intentions and feelings onto the 
characters. Third, after adding the above error covariances, I found that SubReason_2 and 
SubReason_3 are cross-loaded under “external attribution” and “understanding”, Proj_6 is cross-
loaded under “internal attribution”. To improve the discriminant validity and clarify the 
differences between each conceptual dimension, I removed these items from the scale. Now the 
dimension of “internal attribution” is completely focused on dispositional factors, which is 
theoretically clearer and makes this dimension more efficient in indicating observer’s perspective 
taking. The scale ends up with 18 items. Fourth, I further added error covariances between 
Proj_2 and Proj_4, MechCause_1 and Iden_2, and Proj_4 and Proj_5 based on the size of 
contribution in decreasing chi-square indicated by modification indices. Although MechCause_1 
and Iden_2 are loaded under two different latent factors, both attributing to external factors and 
understanding the character’s perspective indicate the greater extent of taking an actor’s 
perspective when processing stories. Therefore, it is reasonable to add a link between these two 
items. 
After the above modifications, the overall fit of the model improved substantially. As 
reported in Table 3 and Figure 5, the chi-square (χ2=130.75, df=115, p=.15) is not significant, 
the RMSEA (.02) is less than .05, the lower bound of the 90% confident interval of RMSEA 
(.00) is less than .05 and its upper bound (.03) is less than .10. SRMR (.03) is less than .08 and 
both the CFI (.99) and AGFI (.99) are above .90. All the indices indicate this model has an 
overall good fit. Therefore, H1 is supported. Measurements of actor-observer perspective are 
composed of six factors:  egocentric projection, understanding from the character’s perspective, 
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external attribution, internal attribution, intention judgment, and capability explanations. I use 
this model as the final measurement model of actor-observer perspective and proceed to build the 
structural regression model. 
 
Figure 5. Standardized Coefficients of the Final Measurement Model (Study 4) 
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Baseline Structural Regression Model 
To test H2, H3, and RQ1, I build a path model specifying the links between first-person 
narrative, character vulnerability, the six-dimensions of actor-observer perspective, and 
behavioral intention to perform safe food handling practices. The hypothesized model did not fit 
the data well. Model fit indices are shown in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 6. The chi-square 
(χ2=413.48, df=168, p<.001) is significant, SRMR (.12) is larger than .08, and the RMSEA (.07) 
is larger than .05. Although the upper bound of the 90% confident interval of RMSEA (.07) is 
below .10, its lower bound (.06) is larger than .05, which indicates bad model fit. But both CFI 
(.91) and AGFI (.99) are above .90, which indicates a good model fit.  
In addition, not all the hypothesized paths are significant. Processing highly vulnerable 
story characters only significantly induced egocentric projection (b=.14, p=.01) and increased 
understanding from the character’s perspective (b=.12, p=.06) at marginally significant level. 
These two dimensions of actor’s perspective taking are also associated with audience member’s 
intention to perform safe home food preparation practices. Egocentric projection decreased 
people’s behavioral intention (b=-.26, p=.001), whereas understanding increased people’s 
behavioral intention (b=.30, p<.001). First-person narratives made people less likely to judge the 
character’s behavior as intentional (b=-.15, p=.01), and more likely to understand the character’s 
perspective (b=.13, p=.05) compared third-person narratives. Therefore, H2 and H3 are partially 
supported. To test whether the proposed theoretical model has the potential to have a better 
model fit, further revisions are needed. 
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Figure 6. Standardized Coefficients of the Baseline Structural Regression Model (Study 4) 
Note: Dash lines indicate non-significant path coefficients; all other path coefficients are 
statistically significant at p<.05 level. 
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Revision of the Structural Regression Model 
The revised SR model removed all the non-significant paths, and only specify the impacts 
from character vulnerability to egocentric projection and understanding from character’s 
perspective, from the first-person narrative to understanding and intention judgment, from 
egocentric projection and understanding to behavioral intention.  
After deleting the non-significant paths, the overall fit of the model is significantly 
improved. As reported in Table 3, the chi-square (χ2=82.12, df=68, p=.12) is not significant, the 
RMSEA (.03) is less than .05, the lower bound of the 90% confident interval of RMSEA (.00) is 
less than .05 and its upper bound (.04) is less than .10. SRMR (.03) is less than .08 and both the 
CFI (.99) and AGFI (.99) are above .90. All the indices indicate this model has an overall good 
fit.  
Table 3. Summary of Model Fit Indices (Study 4) 
 
Note:  
a Removed low factor loading items: CHR_2, CHR_3, Ability_3; Removed cross-loading 
factors SubReason_2, SubReason_3; Added error covariances between Proj_5 & Proj_6, 
CHR_1 & CHR_4, Proj_1 & Proj_3, Proj_2 & Proj_4, MechCause_1 & Iden_2, and Proj_4 & 
Proj_5. 
b Deleted all non-significant paths. 
 
MODELS χ2(df) p RMSEA 90% Confidence Interval of RMSEA CFI AGFI SRMR 
One-factor MM 2237.68(252) <.001 .15 (.15 ; .16) .39 .92 .18 
Baseline MM 486.89(237) <.001 .06 (.05; .07) .92 .97 .05 
Revised MMa 130.75(115) .15 .02 (.00 ; .03) .99 .99 .03 
Baseline SR 413.48(168) <.001 .07 (.06; .07) .91 .99 .12 
Revised SRb 82.12(68) .12 .03 (.00 ; .04) .99 .99 .03 
 
 
 
 73 
Results of the statistical tests for individual paths are reported in Figure 7. Hypothesis 2 
predicts first person narratives will induce more actor’s perspective indicated by greater 
egocentric projection, understanding, external attribution, and capability explanations, and less 
intention judgment and internal attribution. Results show a significant effect of first-person 
narrative on understanding. People reading first-person narratives reported a higher level of 
understanding from the story character’s point of view than third-person narratives (b=.11, t = 
2.11, p=.04). First-person narratives also made people less likely to judge the character’s 
behaviors as intentional (b=-.15, t = -2.63, p=.01), compared to third-person narratives. So H2b 
and H2e are supported. To answer RQ1, I found significant effects of character vulnerability on 
egocentric projection and understanding. Stories that feature highly vulnerable characters made 
people more likely to egocentrically project their own goals, thoughts and feelings onto the 
character (b=.14, t = 2.56, p<.001) and have better understanding of the character from the 
character’s perspective (b=.11, t = 1.86, p=.06), compared to stories that feature lower vulnerable 
characters. In addition, understanding the story from the character’s perspective increased 
people’s intention to comply with what is suggested by the story (b=.38, t = 4.04, p<.001); 
whereas egocentrically project one’s thoughts and feelings to understand the story character 
decreased people’s behavioral intentions to perform safe food practices (b=-.33, t = -4.12, 
p<.001). H3 is partially supported. This indicates that the effects of first-person narrative and 
character vulnerability on behavioral intention are mediated by specific dimensions of actor’s 
perspective taking, including egocentric projection and understanding from the character’s 
perspective. More importantly, these dimensions play different roles in influencing health-related 
persuasive outcomes. The indirect effect of reading highly vulnerable character’s story through 
egocentric projection is detrimental to audience’s behavioral intention, b=-0.05, CI [-0.12, -0.01]. 
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In contrast, reading highly vulnerable character’s story through understanding character’s 
perspective increased audience’s intention to follow safe food handling practices, b=0.04, CI 
[0.01, 0.10]. 
 
Figure 7. Standardized Coefficients of the Revised Structural Regression Model (Study 4) 
Note: All path coefficients are statistically significant at p<.05 level. 
 
Discussion 
Through a confirmatory factor analysis, Study 4 further validated the multi-dimensional 
measurements of actor-observer perspective. I identified six unique but interrelated dimensions 
of actor-observer perspective: egocentric projection, understanding from the character’s 
perspective, external attribution, internal attribution, intention judgment, and capability 
explanations. Theoretically, people taking an actor’s perspective taking have higher levels of 
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egocentric projection, understanding from the character’s perspective, external attribution, and 
capability explanations; people taking an observer’s perspective have higher levels of internal 
attribution and intention judgment. Consistently with this theoretical framework, Study 4 found 
that dimensions of egocentric projection, understanding from the character’s perspective, 
external attribution and capability explanations were positively correlated, representing an 
actor’s perspective; and external attribution, intention judgment and were positively correlated, 
representing an observer’s perspective. The significant but low level of correlation between 
external attributions and internal attributions is probably because both of them measure how 
audience members make causal attributions of the character’s behaviors although they indicate 
two different ways of understanding story characters. An unexpected result is that capability 
explanations and internal attributions were strongly correlated. One possible explanation is that 
characters’ skills can also be interpreted as their intrinsic features. Although actors tend to 
explain their behaviors by abilities, observers may also be likely to identify these abilities and 
perceive them as the prerequisites to perform a behavior, especially for intentional behaviors. 
Study 4 also tested the effects of first-person narratives and character vulnerability on 
audience’s perspective taking. Telling the story from the first-person perspective increases 
people’s understanding of the story from the character’s perspective and makes people more 
likely to judge the character’s behaviors as unintentional, compared to third-person narratives. 
Exposure to highly vulnerable characters increases both egocentric projection onto the character 
and understanding from the character’s perspective. Although egocentric projection and 
understanding the character’s perspective are closely-related dimensions under the actor’s 
perspective taking, and both of them are influenced by character vulnerability, their impacts on 
persuasive outcomes are different. Understanding the character’s perspective increases 
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audience’s intentions to behave in a way that is consistent with the story’s persuasive intent. 
However, egocentrically projecting one’s mental states onto characters reduced audience’s 
behavioral intentions to follow what is suggested by the story. These results suggest actor and 
observer’s perspective taking is a general distinction between how people understand story 
characters. There are still some nuanced differences regarding how people take an actor’s or 
observer’s perspective. I distinguished them by identifying the sub-dimensions of the scales. 
Research is encouraged to further investigate the different ways of taking an actor’s or an 
observer’s perspective and identify their unique consequences. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
This dissertation conceptualizes and operationalizes multi-dimensional measurements of 
actor-observer perspective in narrative processing. Taking a social cognitive approach, I propose 
that the actor-observer distinction in perceiving social events may also apply to story processing. 
Taking an actor’s perspective taking is conceptualized as simulating story events from the 
perspective of an actor actively participating in the behavior; taking an observer’s perspective is 
conceptualized as simulating the story events as an onlooker who observes the character’s 
behaviors and maintains a separate self-identify from the character. Study 1 and Study 2 showed 
that the morality of a story character influenced how people understand the character’s mental 
states and behaviors. People tend to take an actor’s perspective when interpreting moral 
characters compared to immoral characters, indicated by higher levels of egocentric projection 
and identification, closer attention to unintentional behaviors, and providing more mechanical 
causes to explain these behaviors. Based on these results, Study 3 and Study 4 further developed 
the six-dimensional actor-observer perspective scales, composed of egocentric projection, 
understanding from a character’s perspective, intention judgment, internal attribution, external 
attribution, and capability explanations. Study 4 also examined the effects of actor-observer 
perspective on persuasion and found that egocentric projection decreased whereas understanding 
from the character’s perspective increased audience members’ behavioral intention. Below I 
discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the scales and the studies for understanding 
narrative processing and persuasion, followed by limitations and future directions of research. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications  
Existing studies of narrative mainly focused on concepts of transportation, identification, 
and empathy, which nicely explained how audience members engage with the overall story or 
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the specific characters. But none of them fully capture how audience members infer mental states 
of the story character. The current research examines narrative processing from a social cognitive 
approach and conceptualizes that there are two ways that an audience member interprets a story 
characters’ mind—an actor’s perspective taking and an observer’s perspective taking. 
Actor/observer perspective taking varies on six dimensions: egocentric projection, understanding 
from a character’s perspective, intention judgment, internal attribution, external attribution, and 
capability explanations. Audience members taking an actor’s perspective have greater egocentric 
projection, understanding from a character’s perspective, and explain story character’s behaviors 
with more external and capability factors. Audience members taking an observer’s perspective 
focus more on the story character’s intentional behaviors and make more internal attributions. 
This dissertation focuses on the nature of narrative processing as simulations of social worlds 
and provides an integrated and refined theoretical framework to deeply understand how 
audiences interpret story characters and story events. It provides valuable insights to categorize 
the different strategies of mental inferences. 
Pragmatically, the multi-dimensional measurements of actor-observer perspective 
provide an easy and useful tool to capture how audience members understand story characters. 
Scholars in social psychology distinguished actor versus observer’s views by coding 
participants’ thoughts, which is cumbersome and highly dependent on the context. The multi-
dimensional scales developed and validated in this dissertation capture the differences of actor’s 
and observer’s perspective taking, are easier to use, and are generalizable to a wide range of 
story contexts. 
One important contribution of this dissertation is that it examines how different features 
of narratives, such as character morality, character vulnerability and first person narratives, 
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influence audience’s perspective taking. As the first attempt to examine impacts of morality on 
different forms of perspective taking, this dissertation extends our understanding of how people 
process moral and immoral characters. Previous studies mainly focused on how morality 
influences audience member’s affective dispositions toward the character, and how moral 
judgment or disengagement of moral judgment influences the way we enjoy media content. My 
studies further develop theories of character morality and character vulnerability and explore 
their roles in inferring mental states of the character and explaining character’s behaviors. 
This dissertation advances the classic actor-observer asymmetry theory, which 
manipulated people’s physical actor-observer position in real social interaction settings, by 
examining how character morality influences actor-observer perspective in narrative processing 
settings. The mental imagination of others’ behaviors can be from either an actor’s or an 
observer’s perspective. Therefore, research in actor-observer asymmetry should extend its focus 
from analyzing the role of actor or observer people physically play to a more fundamental 
psychological process of perspective taking. By identifying character morality, character 
vulnerability, and first-person narratives as important factors that motivate people to take an 
actor’s or observer’s perspective, the current research provides some empirical evidence to 
articulate this basic motivational mechanism behind actor-observer asymmetry. 
The current studies also find that actor-observer perspective plays a role in influencing 
persuasive outcomes in the health persuasion context. Taking an actor’s perspective affects 
audience’s intention to behave consistently with what is advocated in the message—egocentric 
projection decreased whereas understanding from the character’s perspective increased story-
consistent behavioral intention. Taking an observer’s perspective did not significantly influence 
audience’s behavioral intention. It is worth noting that even within actor’s perspective taking, 
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there are some differences between whether people put themselves in the situation and project 
one’s own thoughts and feelings onto the character, or understand the story events from the 
character’s perspective. Although both ways view the event from an actor’s perspective, the 
direction of influence differs. Egocentric projection focuses on the self, using one’s own mind to 
influence the interpretation of the character’s mental states; whereas understanding focuses on 
the character, simulating the character’s mental activities may influence one’s own mind. This 
conceptual difference is supported by the finding that egocentric projection and understanding 
the character’s perspective yield opposite results on behavioral intentions. Study 4 found that 
egocentric projection reduced people’s intention to prepare food safely whereas understanding 
from the character’s perspective enhanced that intention. It is an important finding for health 
practitioners and message designers as egocentrically projecting oneself onto the story character 
could be detrimental to health persuasion. One possibility is that putting the self as an actor in 
story scenarios, especially for events with negative consequences, may induce resistance. This is 
particularly the case when audience members have engaged in similar risky behaviors in the past 
(Zhou & Shapiro, 2017; Kim & Shapiro, 2016). Cautions should be taken when designing 
health-related persuasive messages to avoid audience’s resistance caused by processing the 
message egocentrically. It may also worth exploring whether it is reasonable to conceptualize 
egocentric projection, understanding from another person’s perspective, and observer’s 
perspective as three distinct ways of processing story characters. 
Limitations 
This research also suffers from several limitations. First, although results from the four 
studies show that character morality, first person accounts, and character vulnerability influenced 
how people take an actor or an observer’s perspective in processing stories, the actor’s or 
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observer’s perspective was measured not manipulated. To test our notion that egocentric 
projection, understanding from the character’s perspective, and behavioral explanations are the 
indicators of which perspective people take during narrative processing, a more direct 
manipulation of actor-observer perspective could be employed. For example, researchers could 
explicitly instruct subjects to imagine self as an actor subjectively participating in the events or 
as an observer maintaining objective about the events. However, these kinds of conscious 
manipulations may not completely represent or induce the unconscious mental inferencing 
processes. Further studies may seek for more direct and natural manipulations of actor-observer 
perspective. 
Second, more effort should be spent to explain the inconsistency between my results and 
the folk-conceptual theory’s hypotheses about asymmetries in explaining intentional behaviors. 
In Study 4, subjective reason explanations were completely removed from the scale because of 
cross-loading issues. According to folk-conceptual theory, at a more nuanced level, actors and 
observers further show a belief-desire asymmetry for reason explanations. It is suggested that 
actors offer more belief reasons while observers offer more desire reasons, because beliefs are 
more idiosyncratically held while desire reasons can be easily inferred from general social norms 
and cultural practices (Bruner, 1990; Malle, 2005). Therefore, it is reasonable that subjective 
reason explanations are loaded under multiple dimensions, indicating both actor’s and observer’s 
perspective taking. Particular attention should be devoted to developing measures that 
distinguish subjective reason explanations at a more nuanced level. Further categorizing 
subjective reason explanations into desires, beliefs and valuing may provide some insights for 
addressing the theoretical and empirical inconsistencies and refining the scales. 
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Third, to enhance the discriminant validity of actor-observer perspective scales, future 
studies are also encouraged to test whether they can be differentiated from other 
conceptualizations and measures of audience involvement in a story, such as Busselle and 
Bilandzic’s (2009) narrative engagement scale, and Cohen’s (2001) identification scale. While 
most items or dimensions of the narrative engagement scale focus on audience members’ overall 
narrative experience, the actor-observer perspective measures emphasize how audience members 
understand and engage with specific characters. It would be helpful to articulate the differences 
and the connections between these concepts.  
Fourth, actor’s and observer’s perspective taking are not mutually exclusive processes. 
Audience members may switch between the actor’s and observer’s perspective while processing 
a story. Usually, one perspective is more dominant than the other perspective. However, both 
perspectives may take place simultaneously. Thus, it makes more sense to treat them as two 
distinct ways of understanding characters rather than two extremes on one single scale.  
Based on the results of confirmatory factor analysis in Study 4, actor’s perspective was 
indicated by higher levels of egocentric projection, understanding from the character’s 
perspective, external attribution, and capability explanations. And these four elements were 
positively correlated. Observer’s perspective was indicated by higher levels of internal 
attribution and intention judgment. And these two elements were positively correlated. The 
elements under actor’s and observer’s perspective were not negatively related, further indicating 
that actor’s and observer’s perspective are not mutually exclusive. In fact, external attribution 
and internal attribution, capability explanations and internal attribution are positively correlated. 
These results can be explained by the shared theoretical foundations of external/internal 
attribution, both rooted in the attribution theory. The close relationship between capability and 
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internal judgment is probably because both people’s internal motives and the capability of 
performing an action are key sources for intentionality judgment (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 
2001). Further studies are encouraged to explicate the theoretical relations among the six 
elements. 
Future Directions 
Besides first-person narratives, morality and vulnerability of the story character, other 
narrative features, such as the nature of the story event, or message frames may also be the 
potential predictors of whether people take an actor’s or an observer’s perspective. Additionally, 
effects of mental capability and cultural difference on actor-observer perspective are worth 
exploring in future studies. The conceptualization and operationalization of actor-observer 
perspective proposed in this dissertation may also have the potential to be applied in other 
contexts, such as virtual reality. In the following part, I would like to make some specific 
suggestions for the future direction of research on actor-observer perspective in narrative 
processing.  
Nature of the event. The causal relationship between actor-observer perspective and 
concrete-abstract mental construal of events is bi-directional (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009). 
A number of factors regarding the nature of the event may influence audience member’s mental 
construal of this event and further influence actor-observer perspective, including (1) whether a 
story describes a social event that involves interactions with different people or describes an 
event completed by oneself that only involves interactions with objects, (2) whether the event is 
perceived close to or distant from the audience, and (3) whether the audience members are 
familiar with the events. Social events are associated with high abstract mental whereas 
individual-oriented events are associated with low concrete mental construal (Iyengar, 1991). 
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People perceive temporal and physically proximal events as psychologically closer to them, thus 
are more motivated to simulate these close events with more sensorial and contextual details than 
distant events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 2007). The higher level of sensations and 
emotions (as opposed to objective facts) corresponds to the actor’s perspective taking (Eich 
Nelson, Leghari, & Handy, 2009; Nigro & Neisser, 1983), leading to a stronger feeling of re-
experiencing or pre-experiencing of the events. Additionally, processing events that people are 
familiar with or have the expertise of induces low mental construal with greater detail-oriented 
and local perception than unfamiliar events (Förster, 2009). Therefore, it is reasonable to predict 
that processing stories of individual, temporally or geographically close, and familiar events may 
lead to actor’s perspective taking whereas processing stories of social, temporally or 
geographically distant, and unfamiliar events may lead to observer’s perspective taking. Further 
research could empirically test these hypotheses. 
Message Frame. Message frame refers to the emphasis of a message—whether on the 
positive or the negative consequences of adopting or failing to adopt a particular behavior 
(Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Two statements that are objectively equivalent in meaning may 
lead to different perceptions of the behavior depending on whether the statement focuses on the 
negative (or loss) or the positive (or gain) aspect of the same behavioral outcome (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Different narrative frames direct people to focus on different aspects of the 
described event as well as different ways of thinking the character’s behaviors. Although there is 
no direct evidence for its impact on actor-observer perspective in narrative processing, impacts 
of event valence have been examined in personal memories. People tend to recall their stressful 
experiences from an observer’s perspective to alleviate the anxiety or other intensive emotions 
associated with the negative situation (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Sutin & Robins, 2008) and to face 
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the problem more rationally. The same mechanism may potentially apply to processing others’ 
experience in stories as well. It is worth exploring whether framing the event positively would 
motivate audience members to take an actor’s perspective whereas framing the event negatively 
would motivate audiences to take an observer’s perspective in narrative processing. 
Mental capability. Humans are not born with capacities to read others’ minds 
(Callaghan, 2005; Flavell, 1999; Mossler, Marvin, & Greenberg, 1976). Deficits in developing 
perspective taking capacities lead to being unable to consider others’ thoughts and lack of social 
skills (Klin, Volkmar, & Sparrow, 1992). Besides personality or biological factors, we should 
note that situational/contextual factors could also influence people’s ability to take perspectives. 
In understanding narrative characters and events, when the background knowledge about a 
character is limited or the character’s viewpoint is too different from one’s own to make sense 
of, readers lack available mental resources to take the perspective of the character. Another 
situation is when a reader experiences high cognitive load when processing the narrative, e.g., 
multitasking, or the message contains too much new information. Under such circumstances, 
readers could not fully apply their perspective taking skills.  
Regardless of whether the lack of capability is caused by dispositional or situational 
factors, mental capacities can potentially influence whether an individual adopts an actor’s or an 
observer’s perspective in processing narrative. However, there are few empirical studies 
examining how capabilities influence actor-observer perspective. Although some studies 
speculate actor’s perspective is primary for visual imagery, more and more evidence shows that 
it requires relatively equivalent capacity and mental efforts to take an actor’s and an observer’s 
perspective (Brunyé et al., 2011). More efforts are needed to explore the capability factors in 
influencing actor-observer perspective. 
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Cultural difference. Westerners in the individualist cultures usually have independent 
selves and use self as the anchor to perceive others, whereas easterners in the collectivist cultures 
usually have dependent selves and emphasize more on social cohesion than independence and 
autonomy (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). When 
reading others’ emotional expressions, people from collective cultures tend to rely on how a 
generalized other would feel as an observer looking at that expression (Martin & Jones, 2012), 
while Westerners tend to rely on how themselves would feel as an actor generating that 
expression (Cohen & Gunz, 2002). In addition, collectivists (e.g., Chinese) were more tuned into 
another person’s perspective and could better distinguish one’s own perspective from another’s 
perspective than individualists (e.g., Americans) (Wu & Keysar, 2007). These findings indicate 
that people from individualist cultures may utilize the strategy of egocentric projection more 
often to understand another’s mental states whereas people from collectivist cultures may more 
likely to understand another person from that person’s perspective or take an observer’s 
perspective. Future research is encouraged to examine cultural difference as a potential factor to 
influence actor-observer perspective and its implications in cross-cultural communication. 
Virtual Reality Context. The current research points out the values as well as some 
caveats in applying the same psychological mechanisms of interpersonal communication to 
narrative processing. Contextual factors may play an important role in influencing the extent to 
which audience could take an actor’s role. Further studies could examine whether experiencing 
stories in an immersive virtual environment with greater presence and realistic interactions may 
enhance actor’s perspective taking to a higher degree than reading narratives.  
I conducted a pilot study investigating the effects of visual perspective (first vs. third-
person) and avatar identity (self vs. stranger) on behavioral attribution as participants watched a 
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ball-tossing game in virtual reality and found that third-person perspective (3PP) participants 
judged avatar behavior to be more intentional and used more personal reasons to explain it than 
first-person perspective participants (1PP). However, visual perspective did not influence 
attribution to situational factors. There was a significant interaction with identity and visual 
perspective, such that 3PP participants who saw a self-avatar were more likely to attribute avatar 
behavior to ability than 1PP participants with a self-avatar. There was no such difference when 
the avatar was a stranger. These results partially align with previous work on actor-observer 
asymmetry in social interactions and narrative processing. Future studies could explain the 
discrepancies by focusing on participants’ perceived control of the avatar’s behavior and the 
extent of immersion into the virtual world. 
Conclusion 
Taking a social cognitive approach, this dissertation distinguishes two types of 
perspectives in processing narratives. People taking an actor’s perspective actively imagine the 
self or the character engaging in a behavior, focusing on the environment or objects that are 
interacting with the actor and merging the self with the character; people taking an observer’s 
perspective views the behavior as an outsider, focusing on the person who carries out actions and 
making a clear distinction between the self and the observed person. The actor and observer 
perspectives are associated with differences in how actions are interpreted. People tend to take an 
actor’s perspective when interpreting moral characters compared to immoral characters, showing 
higher levels of egocentric projection and identification, closer attention to unintentional 
behaviors, and providing more impersonal causes to explain these behaviors. Processing stories 
of highly (vs. lower) vulnerable characters or first-person (vs. third-person) narratives also lead 
to greater actor’s perspective. 
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Through an exploratory factor analysis and a confirmatory factor analysis using stories in 
different contexts, I developed and validated six-dimensional actor-observer perspective scales to 
capture how audience members understand story characters. The six dimensions are egocentric 
projection, understanding from a character’s perspective, intention judgment, internal attribution, 
external attribution, and capability explanations. Using these measurements, I replicated the 
results regarding the effects of character morality on which perspective people take in narrative 
processing. The different dimensions of actor-observer perspective also have different impacts 
on persuasive outcomes. Understanding from the character’s perspective increases audience’s 
behavioral intentions to follow what is advocated by the story whereas egocentrically projecting 
onto the characters decreases such behavioral intentions.  
Extending the classic theory of actor-observer asymmetry to narrative processing, this 
dissertation advances a new approach to understanding how audience members process narrative. 
Identifying the different perspectives audience members take in interpreting characters provides 
valuable insights into the nature of narrative processing. Taking the actor’s or the observer’s 
perspective is associated with unique mechanisms of mental inference and leads to different 
communication consequences. Understanding the distinctions between the actor’s and the 
observer’s perspective in processing narratives may promote theory development in areas of 
media psychology, media entertainment, persuasion and mediated communication. The multi-
dimensional scales developed and validated in this dissertation also provide an easy and useful 
tool to capture how audience members understand story characters.  
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APPENDIX A: STORY STIMULI IN STUDY 1-3 
Moral Alice 
Alice, a biology student at Texas Tech University, was walking across campus between classes 
on a sunny Spring Tuesday.  Alice was feeling great. She’d just seen her lab grade in Organic 
Chemistry and she got an A+.   
 
Alice felt proud.  The average grade had been really high in part because Alice had spent hours 
helping some of the weaker students. Some of them got an excellent grade on the lab.  It felt 
perfect to do right and do well. 
As Alice approached Frazier Pavilion near the Masked Rider statue, she noticed a thin man in his 
mid-30s crouching next to a bicycle. The chain had come off and he was clearly struggling to get 
the greasy, dirty chain back on, but was failing and making a mess of his clothes.  As she got 
closer, Alice noticed that the man was David Call, the professor of her genetics class.  Alice 
pulled a folding tool out of her backpack and was able to pull the jammed chain out of the 
derailleur and back where it belonged.  Prof. Call smiled and thanked her.  “I promise I know 
more about DNA chains than bicycle chains,” he joked. 
 
Immoral Alice 
Alice, a biology student at Texas Tech University, was walking across campus between classes 
on a sunny Spring Tuesday.  Alice was feeling great. She’d just seen her lab grade in Organic 
Chemistry and she got an A+.   
 
Alice felt clever. The average grade had been really low in part because Alice had replaced one 
of the key lab chemicals with water. Most of the better students couldn’t get anything to work 
and got poor lab grades. Alice put the real chemical back just after the lab report was due. The 
perfect crime. 
As Alice approached Frazier Pavilion near the Masked Rider statue, she noticed a thin man in his 
mid-30s crouching next to a bicycle. The chain had come off and he was clearly struggling to get 
the greasy, dirty chain back on, but was failing and making a mess of his clothes.  As she got 
closer, Alice noticed that the man was David Call, the professor of her genetics class.  Alice 
pulled a folding tool out of her backpack and was able to pull the jammed chain out of the 
derailleur and back where it belonged.  Prof. Call smiled and thanked her.  “I promise I know 
more about DNA chains than bicycle chains,” he joked. 
 
Moral Steve 
 
Steve was fresh out of the Marketing program at Northwestern University.  He was glad to be 
done with college. He refused to be paid for tutoring several students in a required math class.  A 
friendly Professor had nominated Steve for a public service award. To Steve it was just about 
doing the right thing. 
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After graduating Steve got a job with Bennington, McLaughlin and Epstein in Chicago, and was 
assigned to a team coming up with a marketing plan for a B2B software application.  Steve’s 
team leader, Andre, had only been there 6 months longer than Steve. Rhonda, the other member 
of the team, was a technical wiz but had been passed over for promotion a couple times.  She just 
didn’t have the people skills; Steve got along with her, but suspected she was a little autistic.  
The particular software was useful, ran well, but it was difficult to get customers to understand 
why they needed it.  The team put in 60 hour weeks, and each one contributed pretty equally to 
the marketing plan they came up with.  The whole team was excited about presenting their ideas 
to their boss, Mr. Bennington, next Tuesday, and hoped he would give the go ahead to present to 
the client.  Late Friday afternoon, the rest of the team had left the office, when Steve saw Mr. 
Bennington outside their team room. Bennington came over and asked Steve how things were 
going.  Steve told him briefly about the team’s solution to the problem. Bennington was 
extremely impressed and continued pressing for more information. Bennington loved the 
solution and said that Steve would be in line for a promotion leading a new team. 
 
Immoral Steve 
 
Steve was fresh out of the Marketing program at Northwestern University.  He was glad to be 
done with college. He had been accused of selling answers for the final exam in a required math 
class.  A friendly Professor smoothed things over, and Steve escaped punishment. To Steve it 
was all a game anyway.  Who cared? 
 
After graduating Steve got a job with Bennington, McLaughlin and Epstein in Chicago, and was 
assigned to a team coming up with a marketing plan for a B2B software application.  Steve’s 
team leader, Andre, had only been there 6 months longer than Steve. Rhonda, the other member 
of the team, was a technical wiz but had been passed over for promotion a couple times.  She just 
didn’t have the people skills; Steve got along with her, but suspected she was a little autistic.  
The particular software was useful, ran well, but it was difficult to get customers to understand 
why they needed it.  The team put in 60 hour weeks, and each one contributed pretty equally to 
the marketing plan they came up with.  The whole team was excited about presenting their ideas 
to their boss, Mr. Bennington, next Tuesday, and hoped he would give the go ahead to present to 
the client.  Late Friday afternoon, the rest of the team had left the office, when Steve saw Mr. 
Bennington outside their team room. Bennington came over and asked Steve how things were 
going.  Steve told him briefly about the team’s solution to the problem. Bennington was 
extremely impressed and continued pressing for more information. Bennington loved the 
solution and said that Steve would be in line for a promotion leading a new team. 
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APPENDIX B: STORY STIMULI IN STUDY 4 
Low vulnerability-self 
My family was having one of those holiday family dinners where everybody is in the kitchen at 
once.  The main course was a chicken stew, and I was cutting up the raw chicken.  My 
grandmother was doing something in the sink, so I probably wiped my hands on a towel before 
cutting up some raw vegetables that people ate with a dip while they worked on the meal.  I 
should have washed my hands, I guess.  I was 25-years-old, young and healthy.  I thought I could 
afford to be careless. 
 
The meal was very good and everyone had fun—even in a family like ours with a lot of strong 
opinions. 
 
But just after lunch at work the next day, I started having stomach pain and diarrhea.  After 
several trips to the bathroom, my supervisor sent me home saying I wasn’t getting anything done 
and that I probably had the flu.  It kind of felt like that with chills, fever and a headache.  When 
my husband called and said some other family members were sick, I thought people don’t 
usually all come down with the flu at once.  By the time my husband came home I was in 
unbearable pain, was throwing up, and my diarrhea was bloody.  He took me to urgent care and 
the doctor there sent me to the emergency room.  When we got there I was so dehydrated the 
nurses had a hard time getting a needle in a vein for an IV.  They gave me an anti-nausea med 
they give to chemotherapy patients.   
 
I was in the hospital for days.  My stomach pain was unbearable.  The doctor said I had a 
salmonella infection, a bacteria that is sometimes on raw chicken and undercooked eggs. I 
missed a week of work, a week I couldn’t afford.  
 
As bad as it was, it could have been worse.  Salmonella can be really dangerous for old people.  
Older people usually have weakened immune systems and are more likely to have things like 
diabetes and other diseases.  Even taking drugs for those diseases can make food poisoning 
worse. 
 
I guess I never realized how important washing your hands can be. 
 
High vulnerability—self 
My family was having one of those holiday family dinners where everybody is in the kitchen at 
once.  The main course was a chicken stew, and I was cutting up the raw chicken.  My 
granddaughter was doing something in the sink, so I probably wiped my hands on a towel before 
cutting up some raw vegetables that people ate with a dip while they worked on the meal.  I 
should have washed my hands, I guess.  I was 72-years-old.  I couldn't afford to be careless. 
 
The meal was very good and everyone had fun—even in a family like ours with a lot of strong 
opinions. 
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But just after lunch the next day, I started having stomach pain and diarrhea.  I volunteer at the 
senior center on Tuesdays.  After several trips to the bathroom, the center director sent me home 
saying that I probably had the flu.  It kind of felt like that with chills, fever and a headache.  
When my husband called and said some other family members were sick, I thought people don’t 
usually all come down with the flu at once.  By the time my husband came home I was in 
unbearable pain, was throwing up, and my diarrhea was bloody.  He took me to urgent care and 
the doctor there sent me to the emergency room.  When we got there I was so dehydrated the 
nurses had a hard time getting a needle in a vein for an IV.  They gave me an anti-nausea med 
they give to chemotherapy patients. 
 
I was in the hospital for days.  My stomach pain was unbearable.  The doctor said I had a 
salmonella infection, a bacteria that is sometimes on raw chicken and undercooked eggs. While 
Medicare covered a lot, it didn’t cover everything, and I can’t afford the bills. 
 
The doctors were very worried about me because of my age.  As bad as it was, it could have been 
worse.  Salmonella can be really dangerous for old people.  Older people usually have weakened 
immune systems and are more likely to have things like diabetes and other diseases.  Even taking 
drugs for those diseases can make food poisoning worse. 
 
I guess I never realized how important washing your hands can be. 
 
Low vulnerability-other 
 
My family was having one of those holiday family dinners where everybody is in the kitchen at 
once.  The main course was a chicken stew, and I was cutting up the raw chicken.  My 
granddaughter was doing something in the sink, so I probably wiped my hands on a towel before 
cutting up some raw vegetables that people ate with a dip while they worked on the meal.  I 
should have washed my hands, I guess.  My granddaughter was 25-years-old, young and healthy.  
I thought I could afford to be careless. 
 
The meal was very good and everyone had fun—even in a family like ours with a lot of strong 
opinions. 
 
But just after lunch at work the next day, my granddaughter called me about having stomach 
pain and diarrhea.  After several trips to the bathroom, her supervisor sent her home saying she 
wasn’t getting anything done and that she probably had the flu.  She told me it kind of felt like 
that with chills, fever and a headache.  When my husband called and said some other family 
members were sick, I thought people don’t usually all come down with the flu at once.  By the 
time my husband came home my granddaughter was in unbearable pain, was throwing up, and 
her diarrhea was bloody.  We took her to urgent care and the doctor there sent her to the 
emergency room.  When we got there she was so dehydrated the nurses had a hard time getting a 
needle in a vein for an IV.  They gave her an anti-nausea med they give to chemotherapy 
patients.   
 
 
 
 
 111 
She was in the hospital for days.  Her stomach pain was unbearable.  The doctor said she had a 
salmonella infection, a bacteria that is sometimes on raw chicken and undercooked eggs. she 
missed a week of work, a week she couldn’t afford.  
 
As bad as it was, it could have been worse.  She was relatively young and healthy.  Salmonella 
can be really dangerous for old people.  Older people usually have weakened immune systems 
and are more likely to have things like diabetes and other diseases.  Even taking drugs for those 
diseases can make food poisoning worse. 
 
I guess I never realized how important washing your hands can be. 
 
High vulnerability—other 
 
My family was having one of those holiday family dinners where everybody is in the kitchen at 
once.  The main course was a chicken stew, and I was cutting up the raw chicken.  My 
grandmother was doing something in the sink, so I probably wiped my hands on a towel before 
cutting up some raw vegetables that people ate with a dip while they worked on the meal.  I 
should have washed my hands, I guess.  My grandmother was 72-years-old.  I couldn't afford to 
be careless.  
The meal was very good and everyone had fun—even in a family like ours with a lot of strong 
opinions. 
But just after lunch at work the next day, my grandmother called me about having stomach pain 
and diarrhea.  She volunteers at the senior center on Tuesdays.  After several trips to the 
bathroom, the center director sent her home saying that she probably had the flu.  She told me it 
kind of felt like that with chills, fever and a headache.  When my husband called and said some 
other family members were sick, I thought people don’t usually all come down with the flu at 
once.  By the time my husband came home my grandmother was in unbearable pain, was 
throwing up, and her diarrhea was bloody.  We took her to urgent care and the doctor there sent 
her to the emergency room.  When we got there she was so dehydrated the nurses had a hard 
time getting a needle in a vein for an IV.  They gave her an anti-nausea med they give to 
chemotherapy patients.   
My grandmother was in the hospital for days.  Her stomach pain was unbearable.  The doctor 
said she had a salmonella infection, a bacteria that is sometimes on raw chicken and undercooked 
eggs. While Medicare covered a lot, it didn’t cover everything, and she can’t afford the bills. 
The doctors were very worried about her because of her age.  As bad as it was, it could have 
been worse.  Salmonella can be really dangerous for old people.  Older people usually have 
weakened immune systems and are more likely to have things like diabetes and other 
diseases.  Even taking drugs for those diseases can make food poisoning worse. 
I guess I never realized how important washing your hands can be. 
 
